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ABC ON THE BOOKS AND IN THE COURTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND
MISCLASSIFICATION STATUTES
ANNA DEKNATEL AND LAUREN HOFF-DOWNING*
Across the country, employers frequently misclassify workers as independent
contractors, avoiding obligations to pay minimum wages and overtime, as well as unemployment,
payroll, workers’ compensation, and Social Security taxes. Marking employees as independent
contractors not only harms workers, but also shrinks states’ coffers and burdens businesses that
comply with the law. In recent years, states have responded to reports of widespread
misclassification by passing stricter legislation. From 2004 to 2012, twenty-two states have
modified their statutory definitions of independent contractors or transformed penalties for the
misclassification of employees. While prior articles have analyzed the shortcomings of existing
independent contractor definitions and enforcement mechanisms, this Article is the first to offer a
full analysis of the shape and effectiveness of this recent wave of corrective legislation.
The Article first analyzes these statutes, identifies shared and distinct features, and
evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. It next examines how these statutes are faring in
practice in terms of employer attempts to skirt these laws and courts’ responses. Although the
reforms often improve prior statutes, we identify common flaws revealed during adjudication. To
avoid liability under stricter misclassification statutes, employers have used tactics such as
classifying workers as business entities, exploiting subcontracting structures, and simply arguing
semantic distinctions under the independent contractor tests.
Finally, the Article uses its analysis of current reforms and enforcement efforts to make
recommendations for legislatures and courts interested in effectively limiting misclassification.
Our findings suggest that the most common independent contractor definition, the “ABC” test,
can successfully combat misclassification and some egregious employer tactics. Its succinct and
objective demands are most effective when applied uniformly to all workers and universally
across all employment statutes. However, some employers have still evaded liability under the
ABC test. We provide model legislative reforms and identify arguments that plaintiffs and
enforcement agencies can use to prevent employers from exploiting statutory weaknesses.
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INTRODUCTION
The power of the Internal Revenue Service’s 1099 form for any individual worker is
vast: when an employer uses a 1099 form to file a payment, it categorizes that worker as an
“independent contractor” rather than as an “employee”1 and determines whether she is entitled to
a vast array of legal protections and benefits.2 Employees are shielded by antidiscrimination

* Lauren Hoff-Downing and Anna Deknatel graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 2014, where
they were both Toll Public Interest Scholars. Lauren Hoff-Downing is currently a fellow at Murphy Anderson PLLC, a
union and employee-side firm. Anna Deknatel is a law clerk at the Eastern District of New York Bankruptcy Court.
Thanks to Professor Sophia Lee for her guidance and feedback in developing and editing this paper. We also
appreciate the time and input of Sarah Leberstein and Catherine Ruckelshaus.
1

See Reporting Payments to Independent Contractors, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/SmallBusinesses-&-Self-Employed/Reporting-Payments-to-Independent-Contractors (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (describing
the use of form 1099-MISC for reporting payments to independent contractors).
2
See Drew Hintze, The Misclassification Initiative: Colorado Partners with the United States Department
of Labor in an Effort to Crackdown on the Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, DULR ONLINE
(Apr. 23, 2012 4:31 PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2012/4/23/the-misclassification-initiativecolorado-partners-with-the.html (explaining that misclassification of employees as independent contractors deprives
employees of benefits).
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laws,3 wage and hour laws, and family and medical leave protections; independent contractors are
not.4 Employees can access federal and state programs, including unemployment insurance and
workers’ compensation; independent contractors cannot.5 In turn, employers are subject to
liability and tax and benefit contribution requirements under these laws only for their employees.6
Thus, by misclassifying workers as independent contractors, employers avoid these
obligations. The stakes are clear and high. Whether at the local or federal level, reformers have
consistently identified three harms that result from misclassification. First, misclassified workers
are deprived of workplace protections and remedies to workplace harms like discrimination and
wage theft.7 Second, businesses that play by the rules compete with businesses taking unfair
advantages to their bottom line by skirting taxes.8 And finally, state and local governments and
their constituents are divested of millions of dollars in lost payments to unemployment insurance
funds, payroll taxes, and workers’ compensation funds.9
Still, until recently, many employers regularly flaunted the national and local laws
governing this consequential distinction, while regulators and agencies generally looked the other
way: a 2000 Department of Labor study that audited businesses in nine states indicated that
between ten and thirty percent of employers misclassified at least some portion of their workers.10
However, state legislators and regulators have since fiercely attacked this rampant culture of
misclassification. In the last several years, over twenty states have tightened requirements on
which workers can be deemed independent contractors or have instituted new and stronger
punishments for those businesses that misclassify.11 Burdens on local government coffers appear
3

Coverage, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/coverage.cfm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
4
Hintze, supra note 2; Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Misclassification as
Independent Contractors, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
5

Hintze, supra note 2; Wage and Hour Div., supra note 4.

6

See, e.g., Hintze, supra note 2 (explaining that employers who misclassify workers do not pay “federal
and state unemployment taxes, Social Security and Medicare taxes, and workers’ compensation benefits”); Wage and
Hour Div., supra note 4 (“Employee misclassification also generates substantial losses to the Treasury and the Social
Security and Medicare funds, as well as to state unemployment insurance and workers compensation funds.”).
7

Robert W. Wood, New Age Scrutiny of Employee vs. Contractor Liabilities, 2009 BUSINESS LAW NEWS,
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, no. 2, at 12, 12 (An employer “must pay [employees] wages, withhold taxes, give them
employee benefits, be liable for any acts of negligence during their employment, and face the scrutiny of state and federal
law when it comes to nondiscrimination, discipline, and termination.”).
8

Olympia Meola, Va. Should Consider Outlawing Misclassifying Workers, JLARC
Says,TIMESDISPATCH.COM (June 11, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/virginia-politics/2012/
jun/11/va-should-consider-outlawing-misclassifying-worker-ar-1979801/. “Employers who are correctly categorizing may
not have a ‘level playing field,’ said JLARC [Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission] project leader Walt
Smiley.” Id.
9

Chaz Bolte, Triple Jeopardy: Misclassification Doesn’t Just Cost Workers Wages, It Robs Government of
Revenue and Local Business of a Chance to Compete, WEPARTYPATRIOTS.COM (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://wepartypatriots.com/wp/2011/12/08/misclassification-epidemic/.
10
PLANMATICS, INC., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS, at iii (2000), http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND
TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 11 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293679.pdf.
11

See An Act Further Regulating Public Construction in the Commonwealth, 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

56

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

2/17/15 3:14 PM

[Vol. 18.1

139 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. (West 2004)) (effective July 19, 2004);
Act of April 4, 2005, 2005 N.M. Laws ch. 94, (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2005)) (effective June 17,
2005); An Act Relating to Independent Contractors, 2005 Or. Laws ch. 533 (West) (codified as amended at OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 310.800, 316.162, 670.600, 670.605, 657.040 (West 2006)) (effective Jan. 1, 2006); Act of May 25, 2007,
2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 135 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. (West
2007)); An Act Concerning Penalties for Concealing Employment or Other Information Related to Workers’
Compensation Premiums, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 07-89 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-288, 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2007)); Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act, 2007 N.J. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 114 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:20-1 to 34:20-11 (West 2007)) (effective July 13, 2007); Act of July 17,
2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:4, 275:42,
275-E:1, 279:1, 281-A:2, 6:12 (2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Employee Classification Act, 2007 Ill. Laws 26 Legis.
Serv. ch. 26 (West) (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1 to 185/999 (West 2007)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Act of
Mar. 20, 2008, 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 102 (West) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.145,
51.08.070, 51.08.180, 51.08.181, 51.08.195 (West 2008)) (effective June 12, 2008); An Act Concerning Employee
Misclassification, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 08-156 (West) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-57h, 31-57i
(West 2008)) (effective July 1, 2008); An Act Concerning the Misclassification of Employers as Independent Contractors,
2009 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 406 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-72-114 (2009)) (effective June 2, 2009); Act of
July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws ch. 845 (West) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700, 670.705 (West 2009))
(effective July 1, 2009); An Act to Ensure that Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance,
2009 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 452 (West) (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1302-A, 1312, tit. 39-A,
§§ 102, 105-A (2009)) (effective Sept. 12, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act of 2009, 2009 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv.
ch. 188 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (LexisNexis 2009))
(effective Oct. 1, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act, 77 Del. Laws ch. 192 (2009) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 35013514 (West 2009)) (effective Oct. 29, 2009); An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Labor and Safety, 2009 Ind.
Legis. Serv. ch. 164 (West) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-8.1-3-21.2, 22-1-1-22, 22-3-1-5, 22-4.1-4-4 (West 2010))
(effective Jan. 1, 2010); Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act Relating to Misclassification of
Employees to Lower Premiums for Workers’ Compensation and Unemployment Compensation, 2010 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch.
142 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act
To Amend the Laws Governing the Misclassification of Construction Workers, 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 649 (West)
(codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2010)) (effective July 12, 2010); Employee
Classification Act, 2010 Neb. Laws ch. 563 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-2901 to 48-2912 (LexisNexis 2010))
(effective July 15, 2010); An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Joint Enforcement Commission on
Employee Misclassification, 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-12 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2010)) (effective Oct. 10, 2010); New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act, 2010 N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 418 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 861 to 861-f (McKinney 2010)) (effective Oct. 26, 2010);
Act of May 12, 2010 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. ch. 292 (West) (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West
2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2011); Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 2010 Pa. Legis. Serv. ch. 72 (West)
(codified at 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.1-933.17 (West 2011)) (effective Feb. 10, 2011); Worker Classification
Coordinated Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 15 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-47-101 to 34-47-202
(LexisNexis 2011)) (effective Mar. 7, 2011); Construction Licensees Related Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413
(codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); Act of May
12, 2011, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 81 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-703, 44-766, 79-3234 (West
2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in the Trucking and Messenger Courier
Industries, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 114 (2011)) repealed by An
Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West 2012); Act of Oct. 9, 2011,
2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 706 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.8, 2753 (West 2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2012);
Act of May 2, 2012, 2012 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-903, 3-903.1, 3-905, 3-906, 3-913 (LexisNexis 2012)) (effective July 1, 2012); Act of May 31,
2012, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 166 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KAN. STAT. ANN. (West 2012))
(effective July 1, 2012); An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643
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to have ignited this wave of statutory change. The economic recession beginning around 2007
collapsed state tax revenues and triggered budget gaps in states across the country.12
Simultaneously, demand for safety net services including unemployment insurance rose steeply,
driving some state unemployment trust funds to insolvency at exactly the moment states had no
extra cash flow.13
The scale of these shortfalls varied by state and was inevitably shaped by each state’s
size, industries, prior legal standards, and enforcement practices, but the issue has not
discriminated by region. Around the country, academic and government reports have measured
the impact of misclassification on state tax revenues or unemployment insurance funds and found
sizeable deficits.14 For example, Colorado’s labor and employment agency assessed that an
imposing $167 million in income tax revenue had gone unpaid annually between 2009 and
2010.15 A policy center focused on Maine’s construction industry estimated its state income tax
shortfall for the construction industry alone could be as high as $4.3 million per year.16 An
analysis of 2002 to 2005 audits of the New York Department of Labor’s Unemployment
Insurance Division revealed an annual average of more than $175 million in underreported taxes
to the state’s unemployment insurance fund.17 Additionally, a state-funded task force in Maryland
estimated that the state had lost as much as $20 million in contributions to its trust fund
annually.18
States have since set out to collect these lost dollars. Unlike other budget balancing
tactics, such as tax increases or service reduction, enforcing and strengthening misclassification
laws appear to have garnered broad political support. Unions have emphasized that reform can
protect workers and provide access to benefits;19 construction workers were vocal during a

(West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A,
401 (2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012).
12

See Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec.
2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/12/state-local-budgets-gordon (“Figure 3 shows that these receipts
fell by roughly $100 billion in real terms from 2007 to 2009.”).
13

See id. (“Figure 5 shows that caseloads for public programs indeed continued or escalated in the
downturn. In particular, enrollments climbed for Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, and higher education from 2007 to
2009.”); Sarah Leberstein, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on
Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project 3 (updated Aug. 2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/0693974
b8e20a9213e_g8m6bhyfx.pdf.
14

Leberstein, supra note 13.

15

COLO. DEP’T OF LABOR AND EMP’T, MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS, ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 11 (2011), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blob
header=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251719071697&ssbinary=true.
16

FRANÇOISE CARRÉ & RANDALL WILSON, CONSTRUCTION POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 2, 10-11 (2005),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Maine%20Misclassification%20Maine.pdf.
17

LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES RYAN LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, CORNELL UNIV., THE COST OF
WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 10 (2007), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1009&context=reports.
18

MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT
TASK FORCE ON WORKPLACE FRAUD 6 (2009), http://www.dllr.state.md.us/workplacefraudtaskforce/wpftfannrep.pdf.
19

See Teamsters Support Senate Efforts To Protect Workers From Misclassification, Teamsters (June 17,
2010), http://teamster.org/content/teamsters-support-senate-efforts-protect-workers-misclassification.
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Vermont legislative campaign,20 and a carpenters union fought for reform in Minnesota and
Wisconsin.21
In particular, advocates have successfully prevented mass resistance to these reform
measures by labeling resistance “job killing” or harmful to business, and by highlighting benefits
of more effective regulatory schemes to businesses that follow the law. As Ellen Golombek,
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, succinctly explained,
misclassification “destabilizes the business climate by causing responsible businesses to suffer
unfair competition.”22 States increasing penalties for violating existing definitions of independent
contracting have especially seen support from some members of their business community, as the
costs of stricter enforcement of the legal status quo would only be borne by current rule
breakers.23
In some states, prior legal regimes were themselves complex, making compliance costly
and acting as a barrier to the legitimate use of independent contracting, which can be beneficial to
both businesses and the people they hire. As one example, Oregon’s legislature was motivated by
a mobilized business community calling for “an easier to understand and more broadly applied
law.”24 In states with complex laws, employer backing has also come from emphasizing that
eliminating “routine practices” is not the aim of reforms, as “[e]mployers legitimately contract
every day with other independent businesses, typically to perform specialty jobs that the
contractor performs for a variety of customers.”25
A dramatic boom of legislating activity around misclassification has occurred across the
country. Twenty-two states have passed one or more statutes between 2004 and 2012 to alter their
prior requirements for designating independent contractors or to alter the enforcement structure or
penalties used against employers who fail to do so correctly.26 Four states, (Washington,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Oregon), began their new focus on misclassification before the
economic recession in 2007.27 Since then, the wave of statutes has grown every year. In 2007, five
20

See Press Release, TJ Donovan Receives Support of Vermont Building and Construction Trades Council,
(June 19, 2012), available at http://vtdigger.org/2012/06/19/tj-donovan-receives-support-of-vermont-building-andconstruction-trades-council/.
21

See Fight Against Misclassification Fraud Moves Forward in MN, N. COUNTRY CARPENTER, May - Aug.
2009, at 4, available at http://www.northcountrycarpenter.org/magazines/August%202009%20magazine.pdf (“A series of
new laws advocated by our union that regulates independent contractors in the construction industry became Minnesota
law January 1, 2009.”).
22

Bolte, supra note 9.

23

See, e.g., STATE OF CONN. JOINT ENFORCEMENT COMM’N ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2011), http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/wgwkstnd/JEC/JEC.pdf (noting Connecticut increased penalties for
misclassification after receiving “substantial feedback from the business community that existing penalties were
insufficient”).
24

Jim Bruson, Oregon Changes the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTORS BULL. BOARD, 7 (Oct. 2005), http://www.oregon.gov/CCB/Documents/pdf/Oct05.pdf.
25

Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by Misclassification: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus,
Legal Co-Director, National Employment Law Project), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/Ruckelshaus.pdf.
26

See supra note 11.

27

See An Act Relating to Employment, 1991Wash Legis. Serv. ch. 246 (West) (amending WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014)) (effective Jan. 1, 1992); An Act Further Regulating Public Construction in the
Commonwealth, 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 139 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS
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states set misclassification legislation into effect;28 in 2008, two more joined;29 in 2009, six states
passed laws relevant to independent contracting and misclassification;30 in 2010 eight states
legislated on the issue;31 five additional legislative changes came online in 2011;32 and 2012 saw
ANN. (West 2004)) (effective July 19, 2004); Act of April 4, 2005, 2005 N.M. Laws ch. 94, (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2005)) (effective June 17, 2005); An Act Relating to Independent Contractors, 2005 Or. Laws ch. 533
(West) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 310.800, 316.162, 670.600, 670.605, 657.040 (West 2006))
(effective Jan. 1, 2006).
28

See Act of May 25, 2007, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 135 (West) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. (West 2007)); An Act Concerning Penalties for Concealing Employment or Other
Information Related to Workers’ Compensation Premiums, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 07-89 (West) (codified as
amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288, 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2007)); Construction Industry Independent
Contractor Act, 2007 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 114 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:20-1 to 34:20-11 (West
2007)) (effective July 13, 2007); Act of July 17, 2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis) (codified as
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:4, 275:42, 275-E:1, 279:1, 281-A:2, 6:12 (2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008);
Employee Classification Act, 2007 Ill. Laws 26 Legis. Serv. ch. 26 (West) (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1
to 185/999 (West 2007)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008).
29

See Act of Mar. 20, 2008, 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 102 (West) (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.145, 51.08.070, 51.08.180, 51.08.181, 51.08.195 (West 2008)) (effective June 12, 2008); An Act
Concerning Employee Misclassification, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 08-156 (West) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-57h, 31-57i (West 2008)) (effective July 1, 2008).
30

See An Act Concerning the Misclassification of Employers as Independent Contractors, 2009 Colo. Sess.
Laws ch. 406 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-72-114 (2009)) (effective June 2, 2009); Act of July 28, 2009, 2009
Or. Laws ch. 845 (West) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700, 670.705 (West 2009)) (effective July 1, 2009); An
Act to Ensure that Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. ch.
452 (West) (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1302-A, 1312, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A (2009))
(effective Sept. 12, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act of 2009, 2009 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 188 (LexisNexis)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (LexisNexis 2009)) (effective Oct. 1, 2009);
Workplace Fraud Act, 77 Del. Laws ch. 192 (2009) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501-3514 (West 2009))
(effective Oct. 29, 2009); An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Labor and Safety, 2009 Ind. Legis. Serv. ch. 164
(West) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-8.1-3-21.2, 22-1-1-22, 22-3-1-5, 22-4.1-4-4 (West 2010)) (effective Jan. 1,
2010).
31

See Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act Relating to Misclassification of
Employees to Lower Premiums for Workers’ Compensation and Unemployment Compensation, 2010 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch.
142 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act
To Amend the Laws Governing the Misclassification of Construction Workers, 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 649 (West)
(codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2010)) (effective July 12, 2010); Employee
Classification Act, 2010 Neb. Laws ch. 563 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-2901 to 48-2912 (LexisNexis 2010))
(effective July 15, 2010); An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Joint Enforcement Commission on
Employee Misclassification, 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-12 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2010)) (effective Oct. 10, 2010); New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act, 2010 N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 418 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 861 to 861-f (McKinney 2010)) (effective Oct. 26, 2010);
Act of May 12, 2010 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. ch. 292 (West) (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West
2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2011); Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 2010 Pa. Legis. Serv. ch. 72 (West)
(codified at 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.1-933.17 (West 2011)) (effective Feb. 10, 2011).
32

See Worker Classification Coordinated Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 15 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 34-47-101 to 34-47-202 (LexisNexis 2011)) (effective Mar. 7, 2011); Construction Licensees Related
Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. (LexisNexis
2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); Act of May 12, 2011, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 81 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-703, 44-766, 79-3234 (West 2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in
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three states take legislative action.33
This Article seeks to provide an analysis of this quickly changing legal landscape by
closely examining the array of new statutes as well as the case law applying them. While previous
articles have discussed widespread misclassification, few articles have examined the effectiveness
of the legislative solutions currently being implemented. Recent scholarship has largely focused
on critiquing the traditional common law independent contractor analysis and on suggesting
improvements.34 That traditional test uses many non-dispositive factors to assess the control an
employer has over a worker.35 It has been criticized for being easily manipulated by employers
and for generating uncertainty over a worker’s employee status.36 Scholars have also focused on
legislative adaptations to the independent contractor test, proposing reformulations of the test, or
alternative legislative solutions to increase liability for misclassification.37 Other scholars have
suggested innovative common law causes of action to protect workers against misclassification,
and to allow them to obtain redress when misclassification occurs.38
A handful of articles have discussed the recent wave of legislation modifying the
independent contractor definition or penalties for misclassification, but they have either only
provided a preliminary description of the different statutory models,39 or focused solely on a
particular subset of statutes.40 This Article expands on these analyses, providing an inventory of
the Trucking and Messenger Courier Industries, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 39-A § 114 (2011)) repealed by An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis.
ch. 643 (West 2012); Act of Oct. 9, 2011, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 706 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.8,
2753 (West 2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2012).
33

See Act of May 2, 2012, 2012 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (LexisNexis) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-903, 3-903.1, 3-905, 3-906, 3-913 (LexisNexis 2012)) (effective July 1,
2012); Act of May 31, 2012, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 166 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of KAN.
STAT. ANN. (West 2012)) (effective July 1, 2012); An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,”
2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043,
tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A, 401 (West 2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012).
34

See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 418-21 (2002) (critiquing the common law test); See generally Richard R. Carlson, Why
the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
295, 306-52 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the development of the common law control test, economic
realities test, and exploring the problems with both tests).
35

See Carlson, supra note 34, at 298-99.

36

Befort, supra note 34, at 418-21; Carlson, supra note 34, at 335-36.

37

Carlson, supra note 34, at 301 (proposing a test that focuses on transactions between parties, rather than
employee status); Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4
J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 95, 113 (2010) (arguing for a one factor legal “step back” test, that would reduce
uncertainty for businesses and the government); Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee?
Misclassification of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 129-30 (2010) (suggesting a third
category of workers, “dependent contractors,” who would enjoy some of the same benefits as employees).
38

See, e.g., Jean Tom, Note, Is A Newscarrier an Employee or an Independent Contractor? Deterring
Abuse of the “Independent Contractor” Label Via State Tort Claims, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 501-02 (2001)
(proposing that the use of state tort claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation could be a powerful tool to hold
employers liable for misclassification of employees).
39

See, e.g., Jason M. Goldstein, Money under the Bridge: The Worker Misclassification Problem, 5 FLA. A
& M U. L. REV. 107, 125-29 (2009) (providing a brief overview of state legislation addressing independent contractor
misclassification).
40

See, e.g., Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee
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misclassification legislation recently passed or amended in twenty-two states, including statutes
passed since previous articles were written. In Part I of this Article, we appraise the federal
context during which this state legislative action has occurred. In Part II, we provide a statutory
analysis of recent misclassification legislation, including an investigation of the most effective
features and the apparent weaknesses. Our analysis evaluates, in greater detail than prior articles,
specific statutory features and language, considering both alterations to independent contractor
definitions and strengthened penalties for misclassification.
In Part III, this Article provides an analysis of how these statutes have fared in practice,
through an analysis of case law under the new statutes, an additional step beyond previous
scholarly work that has focused on statutory language. In particular, we focus on limitations that
still exist under current statutory schemes, as well as common arguments employers have made to
avoid liability. Throughout our analysis of employer and court responses, we also suggest ways to
strengthen statutes and to use common law arguments to prevent the current statutory weaknesses
from being exploited by employers.
We believe that objective and predictable definitions benefit most workers. Prior
complex legal regimes have made compliance challenging for even well-intentioned businesses,
beyond employers deliberately taking advantage of weak or unenforced misclassification laws or
those succumbing to the economic pressure of widespread industry practices.41 Our comparison of
the variety of statutory models underscores that efficacy will likely vary, including by the clarity
of reformed laws and the strength of incentives provided by the new laws. Future legislative
efforts should replicate penalty statutes and the codification of a presumption of employee status
with a simplified exception for independent contractors, frequently called the “ABC” test.
Early adjudications under the new statutes also show that some employers are seeking
alternative business models or are finding new strategies to avoid liability for misclassifying their
workers. Distinct from prior employer practices, these tactics—such as companies simply
disappearing or crafting creative legal arguments to dodge accountability—may allow employers
to find safe havens where they are more fully insulated from the reach of the law. Employee
plaintiffs may be best served not only by strengthening statutes to close off these loopholes, but
also by using common law arguments to prevent employers from successfully exploiting such
loopholes.

I. FEDERAL CONTEXT AND COORDINATION WITH STATES’
MISCLASSIFICATION CRACKDOWNS
A worker’s status, as an independent contractor or employee, determines his eligibility
for federal payroll taxes as well as for Social Security, Medicare, and federal worker protections,
such as those under the Fair Labor Standards Act.42 While states currently appear to have taken
the lead in fighting employee misclassification, national attention on misclassification has grown
as concerns have mounted over both losses to federal tax collection and employers escaping the

Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 120-26 (2009) (analyzing in detail five recent statutes that directly penalize
for misclassification and discussing the consequences for states without such statutes).
41

See Mark Wiletsky, Worker Misclassification Poses Serious Risks for Businesses, COLORADOBIZ
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2010.
42

See Hintze, supra note 2.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

62

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

2/17/15 3:14 PM

[Vol. 18.1

reach of federal regulatory worker protections.43 Relative to the entire national workforce, the
scale of independent contracting is not vast: in 2005, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported there
were 10.3 million independent contractors nationally, comprising 7.4% percent of the
workforce.44 Nonetheless, according to Congressman Richard Neal, the Government
Accountability Office estimates that worker misclassification costs the federal treasury $4.7
billion annually in income tax revenues.45
Simultaneous to local misclassification legislating and enforcement, federal enforcement
has expanded, led primarily by the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). In 2007, the IRS delivered a bill to FedEx for $319 million in back taxes and interest,
asserting that a 2002 audit indicated the company had misclassified its more than 13,000 drivers
as independent contractors.46 While FedEx initially won a reversal,47 the Ninth Circuit recently
held that a class of FedEx drivers were employees and had been misclassified as independent
contractors.48 More influential than any ultimate tab to the federal government, the FedEx case
successfully signaled the IRS’s seriousness about identifying employee misclassification and
enforcing compliance. Recent years have seen similar efforts by the DOL’s Wage and Hour
Division: in 2010, the agency collected almost four million dollars in back wages for minimum
wage and overtime violations from misclassification investigations, an almost four hundred
percent increase over the $1.3 million the division collected in 2008.49 In 2010, President
Obama’s federal budget anticipated the inclusion of “at least $7 billion over 10 years,” yielded
from misclassification crackdowns by various agencies.50
The IRS has also steered the national response to misclassification away from
punishments for violations and towards incentives for compliance. In September 2011, it
announced the Voluntary Classification Settlement Program, which encourages employers to
voluntarily reclassify as employees workers whom they have treated as independent contractors
for three years.51 The employers cannot escape all federal payroll tax liability, but “can obtain
substantial relief” via a reduced obligation of about one percent of a year’s wages for the
43

Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Cracks Down on ‘Contractors’ as a Tax Dodge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/business/18workers.html.
44

Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative
Employment Arrangements, February 2005, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (July 27, 2005),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
45
Effects of Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Income Sec. & Family Support and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Richard E. Neal, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures).
46

Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New “Employees”: Their Disgruntled Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP.
L.J. 95, 115 (2009).
47

Wayne Risher, IRS Reverses Assessment over Status of FedEx Drivers, Com. Appeal (Oct. 23, 2008, 9:49
AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/business/government-bolsters-fedex-claims-about-its-drivers.
48

See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).

49

See Joshua Kirkpatrick & Stephanie Hankin, Colorado Latest to Join U.S. DOL to Reduce Worker
Misclassification, LITTLER (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/colorado-latest-join-usdol-reduce-worker-misclassification.
50

Greenhouse, supra note 43.

51

IRS Announces New Voluntary Worker Classification Settlement Program; Past Payroll Tax Relief
Provided to Employers Who Reclassify Their Workers, IRS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-AnnouncesNew-Voluntary-Worker-Classification-Settlement-Program%3B-Past-Payroll-Tax-Relief-Provided-to-Employers-WhoReclassify-Their-Workers.
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reclassified workers, without any interest or penalties.52 The program focuses on the need to
“‘provide certainty and relief to employers’” by allowing them to resolve classification issues “at
a low cost” to “‘give [employers] a fresh start with their tax obligations.’”53 However, this
incentive may be diminished, as the IRS cannot offer to wipe away back payments, penalties, or
interest to other federal or state agencies, a weakness emphasized by the program’s critics.54
To fortify and streamline federal investigations, in September 2011 the IRS and DOL
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enable information sharing and coordination,
citing the need to “level the playing field for law-abiding employers and ensure that employees
receive the protections to which they are entitled.”55 The DOL’s Wage and Hour Division has also
signed similar MOUs to facilitate information sharing with their counterpart agencies in more
than a dozen states.56 Arguably, these agreements not only improve federal investigatory efforts
but also provide a multiplier effect for the consequences of state enforcements, which can now
directly lead to federal tax liabilities, enlarging the incentives against misclassification.
Still, federal activity remains entirely limited to these enforcement tactics, though
multiple bills related to misclassification have been introduced in Congress. As a senator,
President Obama advocated for federal legislation on the topic.57 President Obama’s White House
has expressed support for at least three bills,58 perhaps indicating an opportunity for passage given
recent focus on federal deficits and on closing tax loopholes. While all three proposals include
increased misclassification penalties, their forms otherwise vary. The Taxpayer Responsibility,
Accountability, and Consistency Act of 2009 would empower independent contractors to petition
the IRS for a determination about their status, while also shifting the burden to employers to
demonstrate their reasonable basis for classifying workers as independent contractors.59
Provisions of the Fair Playing Field Act, introduced in both 2010 and 2012, include removing the
legal safe harbor against IRS prosecution of employers who consistently treat workers as
independent contractors and provide a reasonable basis for doing so to the IRS.60 The act would
52

Id. Other program requirements include an application sixty days before the desired reclassification date.
Id. While employers will not be audited on payroll taxes for prior years related to such workers, any employer already
being audited by the IRS, DOL, or a state agency pertaining to worker classification is ineligible. Id.
53

Id. (quoting IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman).

54

John Browning, The IRS Gets Tough on Employers, D CEO MAGAZINE, May-June, 2012, available at
http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2012/may-june/the-irs-gets-tough-on-employers.
55

News Release, Labor Secretary, IRS Commissioner Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Improve
Agencies’ Coordination on Employee Misclassification Compliance and Education, DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20111373.htm.
56

See Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, Dep’t of Labor,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/stateinfo-nojs.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). The states whose
agencies have signed MOUs are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Utah, and Washington. Id.
57

See Robert Wood, White House on Contractor vs. Employee: There Will Be Blood, FORBES, (Sept. 17,
2010, 7:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2010/09/17/white-house-on-contractor-vs-employee-there-willbe-blood/.
58

See id.

59

Bill Would Clarify Independent Contractor Rules, LITTLER (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.littler.com/dcemployment-law-update/bill-would-clarify-independent-contractor-rules-increase-employer-penalties.
60

Fair Playing Field Act of 2012: Congress Trying Again to End ‘Safe Harbor’ for Businesses that May
Have Misclassified Employees as Independent Contractors, PEPPER HAMILTON (March 5, 2012),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?articlekey=2314.
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also create a “Miranda warning for independent contractors,” by requiring written disclosure
about federal tax obligations and the provision of information about employment and labor
issues.61 Finally, the 2011 Employee Misclassification Prevention Act would amend the Fair
Labor Standards Act to demand direct notice to workers about their classification status and right
to challenge that classification, and impose recordkeeping requirements.62
II. ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING LEGISLATION
Legislative action limiting the use of and penalizing the abuse of independent contractor
status for workers has been as varied as states themselves. Each state has tailored its strategy to
the distinct state statutory baseline governing local independent contracting. Some states have
chosen to directly modify the legal requirements for a business to validly use independent
contractors. Such a redefinition strategy has taken multiple forms. In some instances, states have
revised the definitions of independent contracting relevant to singular employee benefits, such as
workers compensation or unemployment insurance, either to bring that definition in line with
others or to test a more rigorous standard. Other states have more ambitiously transformed their
misclassification status quo by setting a universally applicable independent contracting standard
across agencies and employer obligations.
Some states have instead increased enforcement of existing laws, through amplified
investigative efforts, or strengthened penalties for businesses caught misclassifying employees.
Multiple states have accomplished this strategy without direct legislative change, via the use of
task forces that coordinate enforcement resources and information across various state agencies.
In a subset of states focused on increasing compliance through stronger penalties, statutes have
altered liability standards, including the introduction of criminal penalties for misclassification.
Definitional and enforcement strategies have been implemented both independently and in
tandem.
In addition, a group of states has enacted legislation targeting a single industry, almost
solely the local construction industry, seen as the hub of the most egregious and pervasive
misclassification practices. These statutes have tended to be more comprehensive than the
universally applicable statutes and have often combined altered definitions with increased
penalties and enforcement strategies.
A. “Definitional” Statutes
Sixteen states—a majority of those that have recently addressed misclassification
through legislation—have altered their statutory definitions of independent contracting or
employment relationships.63 In many ways, these definitions are at the heart of the matter.
61

Wood, supra note 57.

62

See Kirkpatrick & Hankin, supra note 49.

63

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10; (West 2014); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13-A) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West
2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a)
(LexisNexis 2014)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 50.04.140 (West 2014).
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Without clear communication of which workers are and are not independent contractors,
businesses struggle to comply with the law when attempting to legitimately use independent
contractors, workers are less likely to be aware of misclassification or to pursue a remedy, and
state agencies must expend resources to implement increased penalties and strengthen
enforcement mechanisms.64 All of these complications enable businesses to succeed at
deliberately misclassifying workers.
States have variously simplified their independent contractor definitions, refocused on
new indicia of independence, and standardized definitions across a variety of relevant benefits and
employer obligations. Across the nation, many states include contrasting definitions within
distinct areas of their statutory systems, such as those governing claims and benefits, taxes,
unemployment insurance, or workers compensation. Thus, legislatively shifting the definition of
an independent contractor to prevent misclassification requires more than merely identifying the
clearest or fairest test. Instead, it is a matter of unifying and simplifying the standard: both the test
itself and its consistent application across relevant laws.
1. The Three-Prong ABC Test and Its Reach
In 2004, Massachusetts made its most recent alteration to its statutory definition of
independent contracting, a simplified version of the common law “right to control” factors with a
presumption of employment surmountable only by satisfying a three-prong assessment commonly
referred to as the “ABC” test. The three factors as laid out in the Massachusetts and other state
statutes are: (A) that “the individual is free from direction and control,” applicable both “under his
contract for the performance of service and in fact,” (B) that “the service is performed outside the
usual course of business of the employer,” and (C) that the “individual is customarily engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the service performed.”65 Massachusetts did not create the ABC test,66 but, as
discussed in depth below, the ABC formulation and variations on it has come to dominate reform
of independent contracting definition laws in other states.67 It is of note that this Part examines
only recent statutory changes; other states already have ABC tests and similar definitional
constructions in all or some of their relevant statutes, but an analysis of the full use of the ABC
test across the country is outside the scope of this Article.
In contrast to the ABC formulation, many states’ common law, the IRS, and some state
statutes use tests that identify a legitimate independent contractor by functionally analyzing the
ability of the employer (or “payer”) to “control or direct only the result of the work and not what
will be done and how it will be done.”68 Despite this shared theme, independent contracting
definitions have instead traditionally provided factors for consideration.
Since 1987, the IRS has considered twenty or more factors, to identify the existence of
64

See Wiletsky, supra note 41.

65

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1)-(3) (West 2014).

66

See, e.g., R. Stell, Independent Contractors and ABC Test Reform in Maine, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP.
BUS. (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nfib.com/nfib-in-my-state/nfib-in-my-state-content?cmsid=27943 (indicating that
Maine adopted the ABC test in 1935).
67

See, e.g., R. Stell, Independent Contractors and ABC Test Reform in Maine, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP.
BUS. (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nfib.com/nfib-in-my-state/nfib-in-my-state-content?cmsid=27943.
68

Independent Contractor Defined, IRS (last updated Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/SmallBusinesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Defined.
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an employer- employee relationship; the list was derived from the common law “right to control”
tests and so provides a helpful summary.69 The factors are organized into three categories:
“behavioral control,” “financial control,” and “type of relationship,” and no factor is given
specific weight or treated as dispositive.70 The behavioral control categories are: (1) instruction
type, (2) degree of instruction, (3) evaluation systems and (4) training of the worker.71 To evaluate
financial control, the IRS considers the ability of the business to “control the economic aspects of
worker’s job,” considering: (5) significant investment, (6) unreimbursed expenses, (7) opportunity
for profit or loss, (8) services available to the market or other businesses, and (9) the method of
payment.72 Finally, in considering how the parties themselves “perceive their relationship to each
other,” the IRS examines the presence or absence of (10) written contracts, (11) employee
benefits, (12) permanency of the relationship, and (13) “[s]ervices provided as key activity of the
business.”73 Common law “right to control” tests implement similar non-dispositive factors
regarding the control or direction of the means of work.74
In the eight years from 2004 to 2012, sixteen states—including Maine twice, once
regarding its trucking and courier industries75 and once regarding its unemployment compensation
statute76—have transformed the legal requirements to be an independent contractor.77 All of these
states except two have implemented ABC tests or related formulations. Specifically, Kansas and
Maine chose definitions that use sets of factors resembling common law control tests.78 Some of
69

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION
JCX-26-07 2-5 (2007) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/x-26-07.pdf.

FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES,
70

See Topic 762—Independent Contractor vs. Employee, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc762.html (last
updated July 16, 2014); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 69 at 5.
71
Behavioral
Control,
IRS,
Employed/Behavioral-Control (last updated July 14, 2014).

http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-

72

Financial Control, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/FinancialControl (last updated July 14, 2014).
73

Type of Relationship, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Type-ofRelationship (last updated Aug. 28, 2014).
74

See Topic 762—Independent Contractor vs. Employee, supra note 70. Common law “right to control”
tests include factors such as: the nature and degree of control or instruction, whether a distinction exists between business
or occupation of a worker and an employee, whether work is done with supervision, the amount of skill required, the
amount of tools or materials the worker provides and if work site is provided by employer, the permanency of the
relationship, the method of payment (based on time or by project), the extent to which the services rendered are integral or
needed or part of regular business, the intent of involved parties as to the character of the relationship; and whether the
worker may be employed by more than one firm or employer. See Independent Contractor (Self-Employed or Employee?,
IRS (last updated Oct. 2, 2014) http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/IndependentContractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee.
75

An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in the Trucking and Messenger Courier Industries, 2011
Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 114 (2011)), repealed by An Act to
Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West 2012).
76

An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West)
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A, 401
(West 2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012).
77

See supra note 63.

78

See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West 2014) (codifying a “right to control” test); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13-A) (2014) (codifying a presumption of employee status with several required factors to
overcome that status); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (codifying a free from control factor test with
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these changes apply to only a portion of the state’s statutory scheme, either specific benefits or
certain industries or workers, as will be discussed in further detail below. The ABC test, coupled
with a presumption of employee status unless the employer demonstrates compliance, has been
the clearly favored test of state legislatures; most of these states adopted a clear or recognizable
ABC formulation.79 In contrast, some states have made notable variations in the phrasing of the
ABC test. For example, three states, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, and Oregon, established a
hybrid definition, replacing the “B” or “usual course of business” prong with either additional
factors or requirements to satisfy “C,” “customarily engaging in an independently established
trade.”80 And, irrespective of the use of ABC or another formulation, all sixteen states’ statutes,
except for Kansas’s and Maine’s unemployment compensation statutes, either explicitly or
implicitly made employee status the presumption by utilizing a list of mandatory criteria rather
than a set of subjectively weighted factors.81
2. Variations on the ABC Language and Structure
Despite the domination of the ABC formulation, states have made small and large
modifications to the language of each prong, which merit closer analysis to identify disadvantages
and worthy improvements. Worker advocates have called ABC the “most objective” test and “the
most difficult for employers to manipulate.”82 Still, one academic, Professor Buscaglia,
five mandatory factors and seven additional criteria, three of which must be satisfied).
79
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501(a)(7), 3503(c) (West 2014) (using the ABC formula without
alteration with an implicit presumption); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2014) (using altered
ABC factors, such as showing the freedom from direction and control both under contract and in fact, with an explicit
presumption of employee status).
80

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014) (establishing additional factors including that “the person
providing labor or services is responsible for obtaining business registrations or licenses required by state law[,] . . .
furnishes the tools or equipment necessary to provide the labor or services[,] . . . has the authority to hire and fire
employees to perform the labor or services,” and that payment “is made upon completion of the performance of specific
portions of a project or is made on the basis of a periodic retainer,” and listing circumstances that must be met to satisfy
what is commonly known as the C prong, that a worker is engaged in an independently established business.); 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014) (requiring a written contract; in place of the “C” prong to show independently
established trade, six factors are required: possesses tools; ability to realize profit or suffer losses from services;
proprietary interest in a business; maintenance of separate business location; previously performed or held out as available
to perform similar services; maintains liability insurance); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(a-e) (West 2014) (lacking a
“B” prong; its “C” prong mandates three of five factors to show an independently established trade: a separate location;
bearing risk of loss; at least two clients that year, or an attempt to obtain such clients; a significant investment; and the
authority to hire and fire).
81

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (including a list of optional criteria); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West 2014) (specifying a right to control test). Statutes with explicit presumptions include: 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10; (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 861-c (McKinney 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.100 (West 2014).
Statutes with implicit presumptions from mandatory criteria include: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103
(LexisNexis 2014).
82

CATHERINE K. RUCKELSHAUS & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NELP SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
REFORMS 5 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/2011IndependentContractorReformUpdate.pdf.
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complained that the ABC factors are only deceptively simple and in application are “neither
clearer nor easier” than the common law right to control factors that they typically replace.83 He
argued that in application, the prongs’ broad language requires analysis too similar to common
law tests; in particular, he focused on the “A” prong and claimed it incorporates common law
right to control analysis by requiring courts to “weigh several factors to determine if the employer
exercises sufficient control over the work.”84
The “A” prong does focus—similarly to the common law test—on the relationship
between the parties and the presence of control. Yet, while common law tests may look beyond
the language of the contract or may require courts to consider the practical relationship when a
contract is absent, Massachusetts’s statute explicitly mandates that freedom from direction and
control be demonstrated contractually and in fact, 85 thus amplifying the prong’s demand with a
patently objective, although perhaps malleable, requirement. Four other states, Washington, New
York, Nebraska, and Maryland, have adopted the “A” prong with the language that requires proof
of both contractual language and the employment relationship in fact.86 In New York, this
mechanism’s power has become apparent in decisions by the state’s Workers’ Compensation
Board under the new law. In one decision, the absence of a contract trumped evidence that a
subcontractor acted free from the control of the prime contractor, by paying its worker who also
knew nothing of the prime contractor.87 Similarly, in another decision regarding a subcontractor
without a written contract with its prime contractor, the board indicated the subcontractor’s
payment responsibilities and actions as a foreman over other workers were simply undertaken “in
addition to” other tasks and “did not endow the claimant with the independent authority” to
overcome an absent written contract.88
Every other state newly utilizing the “A” factor, whether within a full ABC framework
or incorporated into a broader test, has left it to employers, employees, and ultimately to the
discretion of courts to assess the absence or presence of freedom from control.89 Even where the
contractual demand is present, these statutes provide no guidance for interpreting a lack of control
in fact. As with common law tests, along with the presence of a proper written agreement for
independent contracting, the “A” factor still requires evidence that, in practice, the employer has
not exerted control. Nebraska’s statute is unique in asserting that all its ABC factors are not
intended to be interpreted through common law formulations and “shall be considered completed
as written,”90 perhaps attempting to prevent its statutory reform from being rendered irrelevant by
the continued use of common law standards. In contrast, this emphasis on the role of contractual
83

Buscaglia, supra note 40, at 129. Professor Buscaglia refers to the ABC test as the “3-prong test.” See id.

at 124, 129.
84

Id. at 129.

85

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1) (West 2014).

86

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.140(1)(a), 50.04.145(1), 51.08.181(1), 51.08.195(1) (West 2014);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c(1)(a) to (c) (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2014)); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (Lexis 2014).
87

Rustuccia Drywall Inc., No. 3060 9427, 2011 WL 2661233, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. June

29, 2011).
88

William A[.] Teague Restorations, No. G000 4014, 2012 WL 106363, at *6 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd.
Jan. 6 2012) While stare decisis prevented the Board from applying New York’s statutory test, the common law test
reached the same result. See id. at *4-6.
89

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014).

90

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5) (LexisNexis 2014).
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language may provide employers with an opening to contractually designate a worker as an
independent contractor, while in reality preserving employee-like control. Still, while the ABC
factors may simplify and clarify the process of drawing lines between independent contracting
and employment, even they cannot remove the complexity inherent in business and labor
structures nor the inevitability of courts applying the tests and reaching differing conclusions
under the same facts.
Two of the four states’ statutes, New York’s and Maryland’s, that include the contractual
requirement language in the “A” prong apply solely to the construction or landscape industry, 91
indicating that such a high bar may be either appropriate or politically feasible only when
regulating an industry known for informal and illegal contracting structures. Moreover, the
distinct attention arising from a singular industry being the subject of a legislative change
arguably places its employers and workers on notice of new demands, including the need for a
written contract to validly work outside employee status.
Notably, three other states with legislation targeted at the construction industry have
eliminated the “B” (course of business) prong and instead incorporated a requirement for a written
contract or a license, parallel to the “A” contractual requirement in formalizing a legitimate
independent contractor: Pennsylvania’s construction-only statute explicitly demands a written
contract;92 New Mexico’s construction law includes licensure as an added factor;93 and Oregon’s
universal law demands “relevant” licenses, which only exist for certain industries.94 Additionally,
under Minnesota’s construction-only law, for a worker to be an independent contractor, the
individual must register with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.95 A former
version of Maine’s workers’ compensation statute also required a contract defining the worker
relationship as one of a list of non-dispositive factors.96 While a solely subjective standard is
potentially vulnerable to manipulation, a demand for contracts functionally bans legitimate but
informal independent contracting structures; that trade-off is clearly one states have not yet found
advantageous outside the construction industry.
The “B” prong shifts attention to the character of the work itself, in relation to the
business of the employer, requiring that independent contracting be performed outside the usual
course of the employer’s business. This prong also has a common variation: four states—
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Washington—have included an allowance that work
performed outside the physical places of the employer’s business suffices as indicia of
independent contracting.97 Only Nebraska and Washington’s statutes are universally applicable
(although they only applies under the Workers’ Compensation statute, they apply to all
industries);98 the other two only regulate specific industries.99
91

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c(1)(a) (McKinney 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903 (West

92

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(a)(1) (West 2014).

93

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(2)(West 2014).

2014).

94

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(2)(c) (West 2014) (referencing licensing requirements for architects,
landscapers, and construction workers).
95

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 subdiv. 2 (West 2014).

96

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13) (2010) (repealed 2011).

97

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c) (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(b)
(LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(b) (West 2014).
98

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014).

99

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903(c) (LexisNexis 2014);; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West
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In contrast, the above-mentioned statutes in Pennsylvania, Oregon, and New Mexico
have entirely replaced the “B” factor with demands for contracts and licenses.100 Notably,
Pennsylvania provides additional factors including the maintenance of a separate place of
business by the independent contractor.101 In many industries, such as construction, but also
trucking and delivering, as in the high-profile FedEx case, occupations routinely occur outside the
employer’s physical place of business.102 For these workers, treating the physical location of work
as a signal of independent contractor status is arguably overbroad and may heighten their
vulnerability to misclassification. The contrasting strategies in regulations for the construction
industry perhaps illustrate a tension between capturing misclassification in an industry rife with
illegal practices and preserving the ability of employers to hire independent contractors
legitimately underlying these laws, particularly where profitability demands such structures.
Clearly states have weighed these concerns differently, as some enable employers to use
independent contractors at other locations while other states have tightened requirements.
Finally, the “C” prong examines the character of the independent contractor herself,
requiring that she be “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business,”103 arguably the prong most likely to narrow legitimate independent
contracting. States have most drastically altered this prong from the classic model. In
Massachusetts and Maryland, the prong’s demands are uniquely heightened, with a requirement
that such work also be “of the same nature as that involved” in the service performed.104 This
prong’s analysis particularly necessitates subjective interpretation, introducing complexity as
courts use common law factors to apply the formulation to an individual worker. This outcome is
apparent in Washington, where courts, at least in the unemployment context, have analyzed the
presence of an independently established business by citing to a seven-factor test first set out in
1993.105 In Affordable Cabs v. Department of Employment Security, the state’s court of appeals
found a taxicab driver to be an employee because he had not “solicited, advertised, or otherwise
held himself out to the community as being in a separate business,” had not “established himself
as a separate business . . . .[,] did not own his taxi, records, or customer lists,” and “could not
continue his business” without the relationship to the employer.106 These factors are beneficial to
workers in their objectivity and longevity. However, judicial explication of statutory language
2014).
100

See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014).
101

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b) (West 2014).

102

See Laura Stevens, Court Says FedEx Drivers Were Employees, Not Contractors, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, (updated Oct. 3, 2014, 8:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/court-says-fedex-drivers-were-employees-notcontractors-1412382296.
103

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(c) (West 2014).

104

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(3) (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3903(c)(1)(ii)(2) (LexisNexis 2014).
105

See, e.g., Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 917 P.2d 136, 144-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (listing as indications
of an independent business: “(1) worker has separate office or place of business outside of the home; (2) worker has
investment in the business; (3) worker provides equipment and supplies needed for the job; (4) the alleged employer fails
to provide protection from risk of injury or non-payment; (5) worker works for others and has individual business cards;
(6) worker is registered as independent business with state; and (7) worker is able to continue in business even if
relationship with alleged employer is terminated”) (citing Jerome v. State of Washington, 850 P. 2d 1345, 1348 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993).
106

101 P.3d 440, 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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undoubtedly generates less consistency and diminishes notice to employers and employees alike.
Presumably in response to this challenge, four states, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania, have codified specific requirements needed to satisfy “C.”107 Maine’s law entirely
replaced the “C” prong with its mandatory criteria.108 Although the states’ lists are not identical,
they feature shared objective characteristics of independent businesses. New Mexico, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania all ask for the maintenance of a separate business location.109 All four states also
look for evidence of other business relationships: New Mexico and Oregon consider two or more
clients in one year;110 Pennsylvania allows for a business that is available for other
employment;111 Maine requires the right and opportunity to work for multiple entities at the
contractor’s discretion.112 Finally, all four states also provide for indicia of financial liability,
whether framed as financial responsibility,113 as significant investment,114 as bearing the risk of
losses,115 or as exposure to liability.116 These rules lack the simplicity of a plain ABC structure
and prevent the expansion of a standard that is applicable across state lines. Still, if effectively
communicated to employers and workers, these factors could provide a transparent, consistent,
and objective standard of an “independent business” and thus an independent contractor.
3. The Role of the Rebuttable Presumption
An initial presumption of employee status has been more implemented than any other
form or feature of the ABC test: only two states, Kansas and Maine, chose to omit an explicit or
implicit—via mandatory criteria—presumption of employee status from their legislative
redefinition of independent contracting.117 Irrespective of variations in the substantive standards
applied to overcome it, the presumption effectively shifts the burden for establishing a legitimate
independent contracting relationship from the worker to the employer. By placing the onus on
employers to proactively establish their workers as independent contractors, the presumption
transforms the assessment of independent contracting status.
Such debates or adjudications must focus not on an after-the-fact placement of a worker
into a category of employment or independent contracting, but instead on an employer’s
compliance with the independent contracting exception to the rule of employment. The
presumption’s universal application provides an efficient hurdle by removing the need to tailor
analysis distinctly to well-established business structures such as subcontracting versus more
107

See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3) (2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b) (West 2014).
108

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014).

109

See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(6) (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(a) (2014); 43
PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(4) (West 2014).
110

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(c) (2014).

111

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(5)(ii) (West 2014).

112

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E)(1)(a), (c) (2014).

113

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(6)(f) (West 2014).

114

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(d) (West 2014).

115

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(b) (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(2) (West 2014); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E)(c) (2014).
116

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(6) (West 2014).

117

See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West

2014).
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unusual business structures, which may have been created by employers trying to circumvent the
law. Some argue that for exactly this reason, the presumption’s barrier overreaches and blocks
legitimate but “unconventional” employment relationships.118 However, the potency and
conceptual directness of the presumption puts employers on notice that in order to lawfully craft
novel structures, they must observe independent contracting boundaries.
The presumption can also root out common misclassification tactics, including the
establishment of multiple tiers of subcontractors to shift liability and shield a general contractor; a
widespread practice in the construction industry.119 In one illuminating workers’ compensation
dispute in New York, a window installation general contractor and subcontractor both attempted
to evade liability for a worker’s on-the-job injury.120 The state Workers’ Compensation Board
considered that New York’s Construction Industry Fair Play Act, which enacted a presumption
and ABC test, did not apply because the worker was injured prior to the implementation of the
Act.121 The board explicitly noted that under the Act the presumption would have established an
employer-employee relationship; instead, under the prior law, the board found an employee
relationship to the uninsured subcontractor.122 The decision partly turned on the subcontractor
aligning with the general contractor to argue that the worker was an independent contractor, rather
than arguing that the subcontractor and worker were both employees of the general contractor.123
The incentives are clear: if the subcontractor can simultaneously maintain its bottom line and
preserve its business relationship with the general contractor, there is no reason to argue that a
worker has an employee relationship to either entity.
In contrast, a presumption of employment would have shifted that burden, by forcing the
general contractor and subcontractor to proactively establish that each subordinate entity was an
independent contractor. In turn, the subcontractor would have had to choose between
demonstrating that the worker was an independent contractor, or that both the subcontractor and
worker shared employee status under the general contractor.124 In this way, the presumption could
be a powerful tool for realigning the interests of workers and subcontractors and for protecting the
interests of workers without placing the burden of asserting such claims on their shoulders alone.
4. Impacts of Contrasting Implementation Strategies for Definitional Changes
The efficacy of the presumption and of the ABC definition also rest on the choices states
118

E.g., Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating a Workable Legal Standard
for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.93, 102 (2010).
119

See CARRÉ & WILSON, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that employers in the Maine construction industry
“appear to engage in misclassification more frequently than the average of employers across all industries”).
120

Clearview Window Installation, No. 2070 7169, 2011 WL 4819616, at *2-*3 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd.

Aug. 30, 2011).
121

Id. at *4.

122

Id.

123

Id. at *3.

124

Exclusivity rules in workers’ compensation statutes also shift these incentives: where present, such a
rule limits the remedies available to eligible employees to workers’ compensation. Thus, where an injured worker sees the
opportunity to make a tort claim, she may have an interest in arguing to be an independent contractor, while the business
gains an incentive to argue for employer status. See Steven E. Goren, The Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule
and Its Exceptions, 71 MICH. B.J. 59, 60 (1992) (discussing why the exclusivity of Michigan’s workers’ compensation
remedy does not apply to independent contractors).
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have made about the scope and scale of their application, rather than solely on the simplicity and
strength of the presumption and the factors. No state has implemented a universally applicable
ABC test and presumption for all workers and across all statutes governing employee-relevant
benefits and legal obligations, such as taxes, wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance, and
workers compensation. Only three states—Maine, New Hampshire, and Oregon—have legislated
regarding all workers.125 Maine’s change applied only to its workers’ compensation and
unemployment insurance,126 but the state made its laws consistent with preexisting standards in
other statutes, creating a matching standard across all laws. Nine states have made definitional
changes that only regulate the construction industry,127 with one additional state regulating only
the construction and landscaping industries.128 Finally, Utah passed legislation to presume certain
entities are employers, but limited its application to solely a subset of independent contracting
relevant laws.129
The advantages of a uniformly and universally applicable law are clear: if a worker is an
independent contractor under one statute and an employee under another, compliance is expensive
and complex for employers, enforcement becomes inefficient, and workers are hampered from
asserting their eligibility for benefits and protections. In 2009, Maryland Governor Martin
O’Malley recognized this barrier when he issued an executive order to create a Joint Enforcement
Task Force on Workplace Fraud and directly called for overcoming previous reduced “efficiency
and effectiveness” through coordination across agencies, necessitating a uniform test for use by
all agencies.130
A uniform standard can also enhance political support for legislative reform. In 2012,
Maine Governor Paul LePage used the existence of multiple independent contract definitions as
the rationale for stating he would introduce legislation to make a presumption and non-ABC test
uniform across all statutes and workers.131 Governor LePage framed his legislation as a probusiness measure, arguing that the existence of conflicting standards had “virtually eliminated the
use of independent contractors by some businesses.”132 Governor LePage said that a single
125
See An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West);
Act of July 17, 2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis); Act of July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws ch. 845
(West).
126

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (unemployment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A,
§ 102(13-A) (workers’ compensation).
127

See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014) (“Construction Workplace Misclassification Act”); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014) (“New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 482903 to 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014) (“Employee Classification Act”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2009)
(“An Act to Ensure That Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance”) (amended 2010 &
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (“Construction contractors”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501, 3502
(West 2014) (“Workplace Fraud Act”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-1 (West 2014) (“Construction Industry Independent
Contractor Act”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1 to 185/999 (2014) (“Employee Classification Act”).
128

See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014) (“Workplace Fraud Act of

2009”).
129

UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2 (LexisNexis 2014). Utah had also previously defined independent
contractors under its workers’ compensation statute using factors similar to the ABC test, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2103(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2014).
130

See MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, supra note 18, at 8, app. A.

131

See Mal Leary, LePage Pledges Legislation to Redefine ‘Employee,’ BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23,
2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/01/23/politics/lepage-pledges-legislation-to-define-employee.
132

Id.
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standard would “reduce confusion over who’s eligible” for benefits.133 A supporter called the bills
“‘common-sense’ and ‘business-friendly reforms.’”134 Democrats and organized labor opposed
the change as “weakening” the previous standard in workers’ compensation and unemployment
insurance statutes.135 If replicated, reform driven by the business community could trigger a shift
away from the ABC test. A former aide to Governor LePage and local Republican strategist called
the change “a national model for reform.”136 Yet, there is no reason that advocates for the ABC
framework could not wield the same strategy in similarly justifying ABC bills by the cost savings
of their uniform applicability.
The choice to legislatively change statutory definitions for only the construction
industry, or for any other single industry, has more apparent advantages than a definition
applicable only to certain benefits. As discussed above, the states that have passed constructiononly statutes have frequently applied stringent independent contracting definitions, either the
ABC test or additional objective requirements such as contracts and licensing.137 These statutes
have often followed research that identified overrepresentation of the misclassification abuses in
the construction industry, making a broader application politically challenging and of debatable
necessity.138 By targeting political capital at the industry widely understood to be the greatest
culprit of misclassification, construction industry-only statutes can also serve as functional pilot
programs, whose effectiveness can be used as evidence for legislative expansion to all industries.
However, a strategy that starts and ends with the construction industry will leave workers
unprotected in industries where these harms are less widespread or publically known.
B. “Enforcement” Statutes and Strategies
Nineteen states have passed legislation strengthening or transforming enforcement
against the misclassification of workers, both instead of and in addition to definitional changes to
existing statutes.139 Unlike statutory definitions of independent contracting, there is no dominant
133

LePage Signs Workers Comp, Unemployment Bills, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.pressherald.com/news/LePage-signs-workers-comp-unemployment-bills.html.
134

Id.

135

Id.

136

See Dan Demeritt: Responsible Representing Calls for Responsible Criticism, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD
(Oct.
7,
2012),
http://www.pressherald.com/opinion/responsible-representing-calls-for-responsiblecriticism_2012-10-07.html?pagenum=full.
137
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014);
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(2)(c) (West 2014).
138

See, e.g., DONAHUE, LAMARE, & KOTLER, supra note 17, at 4 (estimating that about 15% of New York
State’s misclassification occurs in the construction industry).
139

CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-69, 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/25,
/40, /45, /60 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-2 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908, 3-909, 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C (West 2014);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.722, 181.723, 326B.701 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e
(McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.700 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.5, 933.6 (West 2014); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 692, 708, 1314a (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.06 (West 2014).
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model for these new laws. Most states increased or instituted civil penalties for misclassification,
and several added criminal liability. Wisconsin instituted the power to issue stop-work orders
against businesses,140 and two states, Oregon and Indiana, enacted laws solely to restructure their
state agency enforcement process.141 States appear to be experimenting with a myriad of
enforcement tactics, including targeting intentional misclassification, creating private rights of
action, and implementing successor liability. Measuring the value of each enforcement tool is
challenging, as public records documenting enforcement actions are not readily available and
agency reports often provide data on fines without sufficient context for assessment. Still,
enforcement statutes have some readily apparent benefits. Unlike definitional changes, assessing
penalties does not inherently punish businesses currently in compliance, and thus can avoid
shifting the boundary of legal independent contracting and facing the likely higher political stakes
of such actions.
1. Civil Penalty Increases and the Targeting of Intentional Misclassification
The most common enforcement tactic by state legislatures has been civil penalties for
misclassification. In contrast to regimes where the only incentive against misclassifying a worker
was the assessment of back taxes or benefits, these penalties do more than “place[] the employer
in the same position where he would have been had he properly classified the worker in the first
instance.”142 Seven states have created or increased such penalties for any business that violates
the statute.143 Eight states deliver civil penalties to businesses whose violations are intentional,
either “willful” or “knowing,” depending on the statute. 144 Further, Wisconsin added penalties for
violating a new stop-work order mechanism,145 while Minnesota implemented a registration
scheme for construction industry independent contractors including fines for violators.146
Notably, only Vermont and Maryland provide for liability to carry to a successor
entity.147 Vermont’s statute signals that liability can extend to “any successor employer that has
one or more of the same principals or corporate officers,”148 while Maryland applies continued

140

WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West 2014).

141

See Act of July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws 845 (West) (enacting OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700,
670.705 (West 2006)) (establishing an “Interagency Compliance Network”); Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis.
Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (enacting IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-1 to 22-2-15-6 (West 2010)) (requiring the Indiana
department of labor to develop and implement guidelines and procedures to respond to misclassification complaints).
142

Buscaglia, supra note 40, at 121.

143

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(b) (West
2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-908 (Lexis Nexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(b) (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1314a
(West 2014).
144

CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014) (willful), COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014) (willful); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69a (West 2014) (knowing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3503, 3505 (2014) (knowing); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014) (willful or knowing); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-909 (LexisNexis 2014) (knowing);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(1) (McKinney 2014) (willful); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708 (2014) (willful).
145

WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West 2014).

146

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 (West 2014).

147

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708(c) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908(d), 3-909(g)
(LexisNexis 2014).
148

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708(c) (West 2014).
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liability to “any successor corporation or business entity” with “one or more of the same
principals or officers” who is “engaged in the same or equivalent trade or activity.”149 As such, a
company should not be able to merely restructure, reincorporate, or entirely disband when faced
with the liabilities of its misclassification practices. Such strategies may sound extreme, but given
the already demonstrated propensity for these businesses to break the law, such provisions appear
to be a valuable mechanism, though perhaps redundant of existing corporate law.
Many of these statutes arrange fines in two tiers, with a lower fine for the first offense
and higher fines for every subsequent offense.150 Yet, the price of the fines varies widely. A first
violation costs only $500 in Nebraska151 but as much as $15,000 in Massachusetts152 and a second
violation can cost $2,500 in Pennsylvania153 or $25,000 in Colorado.154 Fines between $1,000 and
$5,000 appear in Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.155 States
also include distinct features, such as an explicit indication in Colorado that investigations will
assess interest in addition to back taxes156 and, in Delaware, an additional $500 per day fine
against a business under investigation that fails to provide books and records to the relevant
agency.157
The use of fines against intentional misclassification, whether “willful” or “knowing,”
appears to be a simple mechanism to effectively target penalties at bad actors. This tool
additionally can funnel businesses into desired actions that demonstrate their intent not to
misclassify workers, perhaps reducing the burden on states to enforce statutes through
investigations and audits. In addition, some states deliver payment directly to the worker in cases
of intentional misclassification: punitive matching awards of up to $2,000 to $4,000 in Illinois and
“restitution” in New Jersey.158
A few states provide businesses a route to rebut the presumption of an employment
relationship, in the process providing information to the state about independent contractors.
Maryland’s construction businesses must provide information to workers and collect signatures
from independent contractors, while Colorado businesses can seek an advisory opinion from the
state’s division of unemployment insurance.159 In addition, Maryland and Delaware also have the
power to assess fines against parties, other than businesses, which knowingly assist
misclassification. Delaware and Maryland’s statute includes penalties up to $20,000 against any
149

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908(d), 3-909(g) (LexisNexis 2014).

150

See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014).

151

Id.

152

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(b) (West 2014).

153

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014).

154

COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(III)(A) (2014).

155

COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(III)(A) (2014) (providing minimum fine of $5,000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 3505(a) (2014) (providing fines ranging from $1,000 to $5,000); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40(a)
(West 2014) (providing maximum fine of $1,000 for first violation, $2,000 for second); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West
2014) (providing fines of $100 to $1,000 and administrative penalties up to $5,000); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West
2014) (providing maximum administrative penalty of $1,000 for the first violation and $2,500 for the second); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 1314a(f)(B) (2014) (providing maximum fine of $5,000).
156

COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(II) (2014).

157

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (2014).

158

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45 (West 2014) (allowing for putative damages in amount equal to the
penalties assessed, which may be double the civil penalties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014).
159

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903.1 (LexisNexis 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(4) (2014).
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knowing assistance as well as knowingly incorporating or forming various business entities to
evade liability for employees.160 Despite these novel tactics, it is unclear the scope of their use or
their value on the books without enforcement.
2. Criminal Liability
Ten states have also added criminal liability for misclassification to their statutes.161
Liability often requires intent and tends to be registered as a misdemeanor that is subject to
prosecution by the state attorney general, as in New Mexico and New York.162 However,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, and Utah have made misclassification subject to low-level
felonies;163 in Illinois misclassification is a felony solely when the crime is a repeat violation.164
Many states provide for a greater penalty for intentional misclassification: for example, both New
York and Massachusetts’ dramatic laws allow up to $50,000 fines.165 Although the use of criminal
liability appears on paper to be an aggressive tactic, the actual assessment of criminal penalties is
hard to track, as investigations appear to typically be private. New York has most publicly
pursued criminal enforcement, under both then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and current
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. The number of cases prosecuted has been small, only six in
2009, but the state’s Misclassification Task Force has publicized those criminal enforcements.166
Criminal penalties could, perhaps, be an effective tool for targeting employers whose workforces
are entirely off the books and those with large-scale misclassification which are insolvent to pay
fines or back taxes and benefits.
3. Stop-Work Orders
Six states have created the ability to issue stop-work orders against businesses
intentionally failing to comply with the law.167 In Wisconsin, where the law does not afford
businesses a hearing prior to the order taking effect, the tactic is controversial,168 presumably
160

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-915 (LexisNexis

2014).
161

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-69, 31-288(g) (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West
2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(a) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(4) (McKinney
2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.5 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 692(c) (West 2014) (violation of stop-work order).
162

See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(4) (McKinney 2014).

163

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-288(g) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110(3)(c)(ii)(B), (C) (LexisNexis 2014).
164

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West 2014).

165

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(a)(1) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e (McKinney 2014).

166

N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION 13 (2010) available at http://www.labor.ny.gov/ui/ 2010Febreport%20with
%20Cover%20to%20Paterson%20and%20Index.pdf.
167
See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.7 (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West 2014); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 692(b) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 3505(b), (f) (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A(5) (2014).
168

Troy D. Thompson, Employees vs. Independent Contractors: State Broadens Enforcement of Worker
Misclassification Issues, INSIDE TRACK (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/insidetrack/pages/
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because the costs of a closed business quickly outpace the scale of the civil fines. Nonetheless,
states are beginning to use stop-work orders as tools: the Connecticut Department of Labor
reported that its Stop-Work Unit issued 127 stop-work orders in the year from March 2010 to
February 2011 and collected $38,700 in civil fines from businesses.169 The state’s Joint
Enforcement Commission identified the orders as more effectively incentivizing businesses
against misclassification than previous penalties, which the state’s business community had
complained were “insufficient to deter knowing misclassification violations.”170 Stop-work orders
are more punitive and more indefinite than monetary penalties, which businesses can calculate
and build into their cost model. The costs of stop-work orders are not only monetary but also
reputational. The costs of delayed work are also borne by any impacted customers, providing an
incentive for customers to negotiate ex ante and pay for properly classified workers or to perhaps
indicate that the business will shift costs to protect the customer if an order is issued.
4. Enforcement Mechanisms: Coordinated Investigations and Increased Resources
Predictably, the actual impact of many of these increased penalties for employee
misclassification is determined by the shape and scale of their enforcement. The heart of
misclassification investigations in many states has been the creation and implementation of task
forces.171 Other states have incorporated information sharing and restructuring of multi-agency
enforcement into their independent contractor statutes. Indiana is one such state, having passed a
statute mandating the sharing of information between agencies about businesses found to
misclassify employees.172 Illinois and Delaware similarly require cooperation and information
sharing about businesses suspected of misclassification.173 Illinois creatively made its independent
contracting investigations self-sustainable by allocating all collected civil fines to the statute’s
administration and its resulting investigations.174
5. Enforcement by Workers: Private Rights of Action and Anti-Retaliation Provisions
Finally, six states—Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Washington—have additionally established private rights of action, empowering aggrieved
workers to initiate suits against an employer violating the independent contracting statute.175 In
Delaware, a worker may initiate an action only after he has filed a complaint to the state and

article.aspx?volume=2&issue=17&articleid=7800.
169

CONN. JOINT ENFORCEMENT COMM’N ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 23, at 2.

170

Id.

171

See, e.g., MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, supra note 18, at 2; MD. DEP’T OF
LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON WORKPLACE
FRAUD 4 (2011), available at http://www.dllr.maryland.gov/workplacefraudtaskforce/wpftfannrep2011.pdf (reporting that
over $600,000 had been paid into the state’s unemployment trust fund from fraud audits).
172

IND. CODE ANN. § 6-8.1-3-21.2(c) (West 2014).

173

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 3507 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/75 (West 2014).

174

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/50 (West 2014).

175

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3508 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (West 2014); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:20-8(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.170(3) (West 2014).
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ninety days have passed without state investigation.176 However, the interest of states in inviting
employee reports to be part of their enforcement schemes is perhaps suspect. Explicit antiretaliation provisions in four states—Delaware, Illinois, New York, and Vermont—protect
workers who complain of misclassification to an agency or file a lawsuit complaining of
misclassification.177 Illinois also allows for “[a]ny interested party” to either file suit or to file a
complaint with the state if that party has a “reasonable belief” that the employer is violating the
statute.178 Considering the competitive harm that misclassification does to businesses who comply
with the law, this mechanism could provide a valuable tool for compliant businesses to enforce
misclassification laws against noncompliant businesses, providing additional buy-in to the
legislation and empowering private actors possessing more resources than workers to assist in
enforcement.
III. EMPLOYER ATTEMPTS TO EVADE MISCLASSIFICATION
LAWS IN ADJUDICATIONS
With the passing of these stricter independent contractor statutes, some employers have
developed new strategies to avoid liability for misclassification. This Part will provide an analysis
of how these statutes are faring against such strategies in adjudications. We focus on the successes
and weaknesses of the ABC test, as it is the most common test used in recent legislation. This test,
or a variation of it, is employed by fourteen of the sixteen states that have changed the statutory
definition of independent contractor.179 Where courts have failed to provide an adequate response
to employer strategies, we will suggest alternative arguments for workers and enforcement
agencies, as well as legislative solutions.
Because many of the independent contractor misclassification statutes have passed
within recent years, this discussion is preliminary. We will concentrate largely on adjudications in
Massachusetts and Washington, where the statutes are older and not industry specific, providing
more opportunity for litigation. This discussion will include cases litigated under Washington’s
Unemployment Insurance independent contractor definition, an ABC statute enacted in 1991.180
This statute’s age in particular has allowed ample time for significant case law to develop. While
impediments to holding employers liable for misclassification are not necessarily widespread,
they may become more pervasive. In some cases, these new strategies may lead employers further
from the reach of the law, as some engage in tactics the law does not yet condemn. We do not
attempt to document every argument or tactic, but instead focus on common approaches used by
employers, including the use of subcontracting, misclassification of workers as business entities,
176

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 3508(a) (West 2014).

177

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/55 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3509 (West 2014); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 710(d) (2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f (McKinney 2014).
178

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/25 (West 2014).

179

DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2014)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600
(West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A,
§ 102(13-A) (2014).
180

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014).
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and the common exploitation of semantic distinctions to claim that a worker meets the elements
of the independent contractor test.
Before exploring employer attempts to evade these new laws, it important to note that
not every employer is responding to stricter laws by trying to exploit their weaknesses. Many
businesses already classify workers correctly as employees, and others are now reclassifying their
independent contractors as employees in response to these new laws.181 Additionally, many law
firms are advising clients to classify correctly.182 The recent wave of legislation has not solely
pushed employers further outside the reach of the law, but has also encouraged many employers
to comply.
A. New Misclassifications: Workers as Business Entities
One strategy that some employers have used to avoid liability under stricter independent
contractor misclassification statutes is to reclassify their independent contractors not as
employees, but as business entities. This tactic may prevent employers from being held liable for
misclassification because some state laws provide that corporations cannot be employees,183 while
others fail to address whether different corporate forms can be considered employees.184 By
classifying workers as business entities, employers can contract with an independent business or
181

See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2011), http://www.mass.gov/lwd/eolwd/jtf/annual-report2011.pdf (“The majority of Massachusetts employers pay their applicable taxes, classify their workers legally, and
contribute in a responsible manner as a part of our economy and as members of the community.”); Renee Inomata, Perils
of Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors, in INSIDE THE MINDS: COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT
REGULATIONS 23 (2012), available at 2012 WL 3279180, at *6 (“[C]osts of class actions are driving decisions by
employers to reclassify workers as employees and to seek prompt and private resolutions of misclassification
allegations.”); WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., 2010 ANNUAL FRAUD REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (2010)
(finding approximately three percent of businesses reclassified workers after being educated about new independent
contractor definitions).
AND

182

See Inomata, supra note 181, at *7 (“In the ever-changing world of employment regulations, counsel and
clients alike should proactively take reclassification efforts seriously to avoid having to defend actions by government
agencies and class action lawyers.”); Sharon L. Davis & Gregory S. Galaida, Misclassification of Workers: “Saving
Money” Can Be Very Costly, 39-DEC COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (Dec. 2010) (“Given the potential for liability, employers must
be extra vigilant with respect to classification of workers as independent contractors.”); Vaughn Burkholder & Tara
Eberline, Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors, 18 No. 2 KAN. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (May 2011)
(“Because of the increased scrutiny on worker misclassification, employers must be extra vigilant to make sure their
workers are properly classified.”); Scott Holt, Will ‘Misclassification Initiatives’ Reduce Employers’ Use of Independent
Contractors?, 15 NO. 4 DEL. EMP. L. LETTER 6 (Apr. 2010) (encouraging employers who employ independent contractors
to conduct internal audits and reviews of worker classifications); Kevin Sullivan, Paying Workers as Independent
Contractors? Better Think Twice, 22 NO. 4 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (May 21, 2012) (urging California businesses to seek
counsel to determine if workers are properly classified under California law); Jasmin M. Rojas, Misclassification Can be
Costly—and Unfair!, 23 NO. 7 MASS. EMP. L. LETTER 3, (Oct. 2012) (“As a result of the intense scrutiny in this area, you
should review your practices and double-check to make sure you aren’t inadvertently misclassifying employees.”); Robert
C. Nagle, Employers Facing Increased Scrutiny Over Worker Classification, 20 NO. 9 PA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (June 2010)
(encouraging employers to review and audit worker classifications).
183

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (stating that individuals will be presumed to be
employees unless they meet certain criteria, and defining the term “individual” as “a human being”).
184

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014) (stating that individuals performing any
service will be considered employees unless they meet certain criteria, without defining the term “individual”).
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limited liability corporation, instead of an individual worker. Employers sometimes also classify
workers as franchisees, partners or owners of the employers’ own business. This Part will provide
an overview of this strategy, potential solutions, and a discussion of employers’ ability to utilize
this tactic under different statutory schemes.
At first brush, it seems logical to prevent a worker from being considered an employee if
the worker is in fact the owner of his or her own independent business. Indeed, this is one
scenario where the independent contractor designation was intended to apply.185 However, in
some instances, employers contract with workers as owners, franchisees, or partners to explicitly
avoid worker protections and tax obligations that come with employee status, when these workers
are not actually franchisees, partners, or owners of anything more than a shell corporation. In
some cases, employers have conditioned hiring a worker on the worker obtaining a business
license.186 Other employers have unsuccessfully argued that the worker is actually a partner in the
employer’s own business.187 After the misclassification statute was passed in Minnesota, there
was an increase in workers forming limited liability corporations.188 This increase was specifically
noted in the construction industry, the only industry covered by the statute.189 Similarly, in 2011
Utah initiated seventy-five enforcement actions against employers who misclassified workers as
owners in the employers’ limited liability corporation.190 These employer tactics have the same
purpose as misclassifying employees as independent contractors; employers are merely using new
labels to achieve the same results. As stated by Utah’s Deputy Commissioner of the Labor
Commission, Alan Hennebold, “‘we will see individuals who are clearly employees called
independent contractors. Now, we’re seeing them called members of LLCs. The beat goes on.’”191
To make matters worse, companies have emerged to assist employers in assembling
these new classifications to avoid liability under new independent contractor statutes.192 For
example, in Utah, there are businesses that help employers classify workers as owners of limited
liability corporations.193 One such company, U&I LLC, helps employers classify their own
workers as owners in U&I LLC.194 U&I LLC advertises that this will help companies save on
labor costs, such as unemployment, workers compensation and payroll taxes.195 U&I LLC also
185

See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 34, at 297 (“‘[I]ndependent contractors’ are clearly employers or business
owners in their own right and are not employees of the persons they serve.”).
186

See Kabrick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, No. 20126-1-III, 2002 WL 91270, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24,
2002) (“Spokane Cab required its drivers to obtain independent business licenses before being allowed to drive for
them.”).
187

See Leffler v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 63900-5-I, 2009 WL 3419587, at *4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct.
26, 2009) (finding construction workers were not partners in the employer’s business); Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 917
P.2d 136, 143-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (finding truck drivers were employees and not participants in joint ventures).
188

ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, REPORT TO THE 2011-2012 BIENNIUM, EIGHTYSEVENTH LEGISLATURE 8 (2011), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/mandated/110509.pdf.
189

Id.

190

UTAH WORKER CLASSIFICATION ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (2011), available at
http://laborcommission.utah.gov/media/pdfs/laborcommission/pubs/AnnualReport2011final.pdf.
191
Lori Prichard, KSL 5 News Investigates Potential Worker Misclassification in Construction Industry,
KSL.COM, (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=10934339.
192

Id.

193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id.
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advertises that this system will still allow employers to exert control and provide direction to their
worker-owners,196 a benefit employers would have to sacrifice if they correctly classified their
workers as independent contractors. Another company, CSG Workforce, which appears to no
longer be in business,197 at one point had 1,500 “member owners,” or workers, that were classified
as owners in its company.198 After being re-classified, these workers worked largely in the same
capacity.199 Such tactics have harmed workers and state coffers by providing a mechanism that
enables employers to avoid paying benefits, payroll taxes, and workers compensation
insurance.200 The negative impact does not fall solely on workers: companies that do comply with
classification statutes have expressed concern over the impact these tactics have had on their
ability to compete in the marketplace.201
1. The Impact of Different Statutory Models on Employers’ Ability to
Exploit a Worker’s Business Status
Misclassification of workers as business entities has already arisen in court
adjudications, and the result the court reaches may depend on the state’s statutory scheme. Some
states’ statutes are silent as to whether a corporation can be considered an employee.202 Other
state employment laws, including but not limited to the independent contractor statute itself,
however, may specifically exempt corporations from being considered employees.203 Similarly,
some courts have interpreted ambiguous employment statutes to mean that corporations cannot be
employees.204 For states in these latter categories, it will be more difficult for workers to argue
that they are employees who have been misclassified as business entities.
However, where courts simply apply the ABC test to determine whether a worker is an
independent contractor, regardless of whether the worker was working in her individual capacity
or under the name of a corporation, the ABC test sufficiently protects both employers and
employees: it protects employers from having true business entities classified as employees, and

196

Id.

197

See BBB Business Review: CSG Workforce Partners LLC, BETTER BUS. BUREAU
http://www.bbb.org/utah/business-reviews/contractors-general/csg-workforce-partners-in-provo-ut-22232962 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2015).
198

Prichard, supra note 191.

199

See, e.g., id. (“Even though one would expect an ‘owner’ to have influence over their workday, Delgado
[who was classified as a member owner of CSG Workforce] says he still took orders from the same contractors. He was
occasionally ordered to work six days a week, which job site to report to and what exactly to do.”).
200

See id.

201

See id.

202

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (2014) (stating that individuals performing any
service will be considered employees unless they meet certain criteria, without defining the term “individual”).
203

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (stating that individuals will be presumed to be
employees unless they meet certain criteria, and defining the term “individual” as “a human being”).
204

Tvedt v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 91 P.3d 1, 11 (Mont. 2004) (interpreting the definition of
employment in Montana’s labor code to prevent a corporation from being an employee of another corporation); Stellar Ins.
Group, Inc. v. Cent. Cos., No. 2:06cv11, 2006 WL 2862218, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2006) (“Plaintiff Stellar, cannot
allege a cause of action under North Carolina’s Wage and Hour Act inasmuch as a ‘corporation’ cannot be an ‘employee’
or wage earner.”); Frank Burns, Inc. v. Interdigital Commc’ns Corp., 704 A.2d 678, 680 (Pa. Super. 1997) (finding that a
corporation cannot be an employee under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law).
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employees from being misclassified by the courts as independent contractors. In a recent case in
Massachusetts, a state whose statute does not explicitly state whether a corporation can be
considered an employee, a court did find that one corporate structure, franchisees, could be
considered employees.205 In making this determination, the court in Awuah v. Coverall North
America, Inc. (Awuah I) applied Massachusetts’s independent contractor statute to the facts of the
case without discussing whether the statute applied to franchisees.206 The franchisee plaintiffs had
entered into a contract to purchase janitorial cleaning franchises from defendant Coverall.207 Until
May 2009, customer contracts were with Coverall, and unless a customer specifically requested it,
franchisees could not be parties to these contracts.208 In addition, each time the plaintiffs cleaned
for a customer, the customer paid Coverall directly.209 The court found that Coverall had
misclassified the plaintiffs because Coverall was unable to establish that the plaintiffs performed
services outside of the course of Coverall’s business; the second prong of the ABC inquiry.210 To
prove this prong, Coverall needed to show that the plaintiffs were performing services as part of
their own business that was independent from Coverall’s business.211 The court determined that
like the plaintiff franchisees, Coverall was in the business of selling cleaning services because it
directly received fees for each service, was a party to each customer contract until May 2009,
trained the franchisees, and provided them with uniforms.212
In applying the second prong of the ABC test, the court analyzed whether the workers
were truly distinct business entities, working in independent businesses outside of the course of
Coverall’s business, or whether the franchisee title was merely an empty label.213 Thus, the ABC
test is sufficient to distinguish between employees and business owners who are performing
distinct services for the employer through their own independent businesses, because this specific
inquiry is written into the independent contractor test. True business entities should meet each
element, and be classified as independent contractors. States that prevent corporations from being
employees are adding an additional, unnecessary layer of protection for employers, leaving
workers unprotected from this form of misclassification.
The Awuah I decision may have closed a loophole that was open for years. According to
a recent article, Awuah “has rocked a significant sector of the U.S. economy that has always
thought franchise arrangements were immune to employee misclassification claims.”214 It is
unclear whether other states will follow the lead of the Massachusetts court in Awuah and find
that franchisees can be misclassified. At the very least, Awuah I has influenced law firm advice to
205

Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D. Mass. 2010).

206

Id.

207

Id. at 82.

208

Id.

209

Id.at 82, 84.

210

Id. at 84.

211

Id. at 82.

212

Id. at 84.

213

See id. at 82. (“To satisfy the second prong, Coverall must establish that the worker ‘is performing
services that are part of an independent, separate, and distinct business from that of the employer.’”) (quoting Am. Zurich
Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus. Accidents, No. 053469A, 2006 WL 2205085, at *4 (Mass. Super. June 1, 2006)).
214

Rochelle B. Spandorf, Who’s the Boss? Franchisors Must Be Able to Demonstrate the Separate and
Distinct Businesses That They and Their Franchisees Operate, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2011, at 18, 18; see also W. Michael
Garner, Employment Relationships, in 1 FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW & PRACTICE § 1:30 (2013) (“In 2010, franchise
practitioners were surprised to learn that a court had ruled a franchised business to be an employee of the franchisor.”).
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employers. This same article advised California practitioners to focus on assisting franchisor
clients in reducing liability for such misclassification.215
Other states have also considered evidence that a worker owns a business as a factor in
determining whether the worker is an independent contractor, without letting such labels end the
inquiry. For example, in Western Ports Transportation, Inc. v. Employment Security Department
of the State of Washington, although the worker, Mr. Marshall, contracted with his employer
under his business’s name, the court still found that he was an employee.216 The court determined
that Marshall was not free from his employer’s control because he was required to keep his truck
clean, to obtain his employer’s permission before transporting passengers, and to go to the
dispatch center to obtain assignments that had not been scheduled in advance.217 Additionally, he
could be terminated for any violation of written company policy.218 Thus, the employer failed to
satisfy the first prong of the ABC test, and Marshall was found to be an employee.219 The court
also noted that his business was unrelated to the work he was performing for the company as a
truck driver.220 Ultimately, case law suggests that thus far, the ABC test allows courts to look
beyond labels and evaluate whether workers are truly engaged in a separate business or whether
the business is being used by the employer to evade wage, tax, and other obligations.
However, where a state’s statutory scheme explicitly exempts corporate forms from
being considered employees, a court may be unable to evaluate whether the worker is operating a
distinct business. In Nelson v. Levy, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that plaintiff Nelson’s
Limited Liability Corporation, C. Nelson Tile Installation, could not be considered an employee
of Majestic Tile & Stone, LLC under Minnesota’s construction-specific independent contractor
statute.221 The Minnesota statute presumes that individuals who perform services for a person are
employees, and defines an “individual” as “a human being.”222 At the time the case was decided,
the statute required such individuals to obtain an independent contractor exemption certification
to overcome the employee presumption.223 Because the statute defines individual as “a human
being,” the court reasoned that under the plain statutory language, C. Nelson Title Installation, as
an LLC, could not obtain such an exemption.224 The court then determined that it had two
choices; it could either automatically find LLCs in the construction industry to always be
employees, or it could conclude that the distinction between employees and independent
contractors was inapplicable to LLCs in the construction industry.225 It chose the latter, holding
that “an LLC is not the employee of another entity.”226 As a result of Nelson, any employer in the
Minnesota construction industry can require workers to create their own limited liability
corporations as a condition of employment, to avoid the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 181.723,
215

Spandorf, supra note 214.

216

W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., 41 P.3d 510, 514, 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

217

Id. at 517-18.

218

Id. at 518

219

Id. at 520.

220

Id. at 514.

221

Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).

222

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014).

223

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 4 (West 2011) (amended 2012).

224

Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 342.

225

Id.

226

Id. at 342-43.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss1/2

ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/17/15 3:14 PM

ABC ON THE BOOKS AND IN THE COURTS

85

and to avoid paying these worker-owners the minimum wage or overtime, and paying the state
unemployment, workers compensation and payroll taxes. Although some state statutes punish
knowing or willing misclassification, if the independent contractor distinction simply does not
apply, such intentional flaunting of the law is technically legal. Thus, depending on the exact
statute, it is currently possible for employers to successfully skirt misclassification laws by
inducing workers to form LLCs and changing their classification of workers from independent
contractor to owners of an LLC.
2. Recommendations
There are potential remedies available to prevent employers from using this strategy to
avoid liability under misclassification statutes, even for workers in states with statutory language
that expressly prohibits corporations from being classified as employees. The best solution would
be a clear statutory amendment that expands the presumption of employee status to include any
person, partner, owner, or any corporate form or business entity. However, until such amendments
are made, there are common law solutions available to worker plaintiffs and enforcement
agencies. Some of these remedies have been untested in the context of independent contractor
misclassification. Other remedies that will be suggested are based on limited case law. As a result,
the likelihood of succeeding in these arguments cannot be predicted with certainty. Accordingly,
the limitations of each argument will be discussed.
i. Statutory Amendments
Most independent contractor statutes do not explicitly extend the presumption of
employee status to all workers who are business entities. An amendment to current independent
contractor statutes that expands the definition of “individual” to include any person, partner,
owner, or any corporate entity would provide the most protection from misclassification.
Employers would still be able to prove that a worker’s work was performed as a part of its own
independent business venture, but employers who force workers into forming their own
businesses would be punished for misclassification. Although the ambiguous statutes in
Washington and Massachusetts have led to some favorable court decisions, such statutes still
leave room for courts to find that the statute precludes corporations from being employees. Thus,
amendments to current statutes that cure ambiguity would allow workers and employers to avoid
extensive litigation in the courts. Both workers and employers would know ex ante whether the
misclassification statute applies to their relationship, reducing uncertainty over classification, a
benefit to both workers and employers.
Some states with more recent statutes or statutory amendments have taken steps to try to
close this loophole. However, most of these statutes or statutory amendments do not cover every
employer or every potential form of misclassification. For example, Utah recently passed
amendments clarifying that construction companies that are required to be licensed will be
presumed to be the employer of all individuals who hold an ownership interest in their
company.227 However, the statute only applies to unincorporated employers, and will only protect

227

See Construction Licensees Related Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413 (amending UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-28-2 to define “unincorporated entity” and create a presumption of employer status). For a listing of
construction businesses required to be licensed under Utah Law, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-301 (LexisNexis 2014).
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workers who are classified as owners in the employer’s own company.228
Similarly, Delaware’s independent contractor statute, while an improvement, still does
not provide enough protection for workers. The statute makes it a violation to:
[K]nowingly incorporate or form, or assist in the incorporation or formation of,
a corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity, or pay or
collect a fee for use of a foreign or domestic corporation, partnership, limited
liability corporation, or other entity for the purpose of facilitating, or evading
detection of, a violation of this section.229
Because it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the employer’s conduct was
knowing, the Delaware statute would be stronger if it presumptively labeled all corporate forms as
employees, rather than solely imposing liability for such incorporation where the misclassification
is intentional.
New York’s statute states that a person will be presumed to be an employee unless it is a
“separate business entity,” including “any sole proprietor, partnership, corporation or entity that
may be a contractor.”230 However, a person will only be considered a “separate business entity”
when the entity meets twelve criteria listed in the statute.231 These criteria include that the
business entity has substantially invested capital in the entity beyond equipment and a vehicle,
regularly makes its services available to the general public, and regularly has the right to perform
such services when it chooses.232 Thus, in contrast to the other statutes, the New York statute
covers all business entities and the criteria listed would seem to prevent a worker who is merely a
shell corporation from being considered an independent contractor.233 However, this statute is
limited in scope as it only applies to the construction industry.234 A statute modeled after the New
York statute that is applicable to all industries should protect workers from being misclassified as
business entities.
ii. Alter Ego Liability
Even without legislative reform, workers and enforcement agencies can use the theory of
alter ego liability to argue that courts should ignore these corporate forms, and still apply the
independent contractor definition to determine whether the plaintiff is an employee. Under alter
228

UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[a]n unincorporated entity that is required to be
licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, is presumed to be the employer of each
individual who, directly or indirectly, holds an ownership interest in the unincorporated entity”); see also 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014) (extending the presumption of employee status to sole proprietors and partnerships, but
failing to expressly include other business entities in this presumption).
229

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503(d) (West 2014).

230

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014).

231

Id. § 861-c(2).

232

Id.

233

For another example of a statute that explicitly allows business entities to be employees see OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 670.600(5)(a) (West 2014) (“The creation or use of a business entity, such as a corporation or a limited
liability company, by an individual for the purpose of providing services does not, by itself, establish that the individual
provides services as an independent contractor.”).
234

N.Y. LAB. § 861-c (McKinney 2014).
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ego liability, a court disregards corporate entity status when that entity is shown to be a fiction or
a mere instrumentality for another corporation.235 For example, alter ego liability exists when a
company perpetrates fraud by claiming to do business with another ostensibly separate
corporation, when in fact the second corporation is a merely a conduit for the company.236
Applying this theory to the misclassification context, if the fictitious corporation (here, the
worker) is found to be in fact inseparable from the employer’s company, the court can disregard
that fictitious entity and hold the employer liable for its use of the worker’s corporate
classification to avoid proper worker classification. Different states employ distinct factors to
determine whether one company or individual is the alter ego of another, but common factors
include undercapitalization, failure to follow statutory incorporation formalities, and neglect of
corporate requirements such as the holding of regular shareholder or director meetings.237
Although this theory has been applied in the labor and employment context, 238 it is not
yet commonly used in suits for misclassification of independent contractors. It thus remains
unclear whether the theory could be successfully used to hold employers liable for
misclassification. The general rule that corporate entity status can be discarded under alter ego
liability is justified as an exception to the policy goal of allowing limited liability through
incorporation.239 As a result, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that this rare exception
should be applied in the independent contractor context. Still, plaintiffs have a strong argument
that the rationale behind limited liability is inapplicable in the worker-owner misclassification
context. The general notion of “piercing the corporate veil” exists because it is “unjust to permit
those who control companies to treat them as single or unitary enterprises and then assert their
corporate separateness in order to commit frauds and other misdeeds with impunity.”240 If the
worker’s incorporation were appropriate, it should be undertaken to provide the worker with
limited liability. Under this logic, the alter ego doctrine may be applicable where workers’
business entities have no purpose beyond helping their employer avoid tax liability and
compliance with wage laws. If litigants can demonstrate that the purpose of a worker’s
incorporation is in fact to shield the employer, it would likely justify an exception to the general
preference of preserving corporate entities and allow a court to hold the employer liable for
misclassification.
Yet, even if plaintiffs successfully argue that alter ego liability is applicable, serious
limitations may remain. It is possible that under this theory only the state, and not the worker, will
be able to recover.241 Or, a court may find the worker to be complicit due to her status as the one
who incorporated the shell corporation, and thus may see her as having unclean hands and bar her
from benefiting from the discarding of that corporate entity.242
235

18 LAURA HUNTER DIETZ ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 52 (2d ed. 2014).

236

Id. § 63.

237

See 114 NEIL A. HELFMAN, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE §§ 5-7 (2014).

238

See 9 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 4:8 (2014) (discussing the application of alter ego liability to
companies that restructure in an attempt to avoid labor laws); 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 98 (2014) (discussing an alter ego
corporation’s liability to contribute to a pension plan).
239

See DIETZ ET AL., supra note 235, at § 63.

240

Id.

241

Marc R. Poulos, Melissa Binetti & Robert G. Reiter, Jr., Employees or Independent Contractors? A New
Test for the Construction Industry, 96 ILL. B.J. 206, 211 (2008).
242

See generally J.V.B., Annotation, He Who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands, 4 A.L.R.
44 (1919) (describing the unclean hands doctrine).
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Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the alter ego strategy’s
likelihood of success, or the jurisdictions in which it is most likely to be successful, at least one
court has found that alter ego theory may be applicable in the independent contractor context. The
case did not involve an employer’s use of a worker’s separate business to avoid liability, but
rather the employer’s use of a different shell corporation to shield itself from liability for
misclassification. In Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Joseph J. Sciamanna, Inc., the
plaintiffs sued Sciamanna, Inc. for misclassifying its workers as independent contractors.243
Sciamanna, Inc. argued that it was not the proper defendant because plaintiffs’ employment
contracts were with an affiliated company, Sciamanna Group East, LLC.244 Sciamanna, Inc. then
argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for alter ego liability between the two companies,
and that the suit against Sciamanna Inc. should be dismissed.245 The court disagreed and found the
plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim of an alter ego relationship.246 The court based this
decision on allegations of the two corporations’ common ownership, and that Sciamanna Inc.
hired plaintiffs, paid them, and ultimately required them to sign backdated independent contractor
agreements with Sciamanna Group East, LLC.247 Thus, although the factual scenario is slightly
different, Sciamanna is an example of how the theory of alter ego liability could be applied under
the independent contractor misclassification framework.
iii. Applying Other Employment Statutes When the State’s Industry-Specific
Statute Omits Corporations
Some states have independent contractor statutes that only apply to workers in specific
industries, typically the construction industry. In states with such industry-specific statutes, there
are often multiple statutes or regulations that use different standards to define independent
contractors in various industries. Where an industry-specific statute explicitly states that
corporations cannot be employees, plaintiffs may be able to argue that the state’s general
independent contractor statute should apply instead of the industry-specific statute.
In Frahs v. Bill’s Automotive, Inc., the court determined that under Minnesota’s general
independent contractor definition for unemployment, a business entity could be an employee.248
After Frahs was terminated, he applied for unemployment benefits.249 The Minnesota Department
of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) then conducted an audit of his employer,
Bill’s Automotive, Inc. (BAI) and determined that Frahs was an employee of BAI.250 BAI argued
that Frahs was not an employee under the court’s earlier decision in Nelson v. Levy which held
that LLCs could not be employees.251 Because BAI paid Frahs’s wages to Frahs’s company,
Tom’s Automotive, rather than to Frahs directly, BAI contended that Frah’s company could not
be an employee under Nelson.252 However, the court noted that the statute at issue in Nelson was
243

No. 08 C 4636, 2009 WL 1543892, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2009).

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. at *3-4.

247

Id.

248

No. A11-1182, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 7, 2012).

249

Id. at *1.

250

Id.

251

Id. at *5 (citing Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)).

252

Id.
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inapplicable in the present case because it only applied to construction workers, and Frahs was not
a construction worker.253 As a result, the court looked to the applicable law, a statute that defines
employment as including “services performed by ‘a member of a limited liability company who is
considered an employee under the common law of employer-employee.’”254 The court determined
that the statute’s language did not prevent a corporation from being considered an employee and
thus applied the common law factors codified in the state’s rules to ultimately find Frahs was an
employee.255
Under Frahs’s reasoning, Minn. Stat. § 181.723 (“Section 181.723”) should have been
inapplicable in the court’s decision in Nelson as well. In Nelson, the court decided that Nelson
could not be considered an employee because he worked for his employer as a limited liability
corporation and the LLC was not a “human being” as required by the statute.256 Section 181.273
specifically states that it has limited applicability, only applying to “individuals performing public
or private sector commercial or residential building construction or improvement services.”257
Because the statute states that it applies limitedly to only individuals, and defines individuals as
human beings, Nelson’s LLC fell outside the scope of the statute. Thus, Section 181.723 should
be inapplicable when the worker is an LLC. This argument would be further buttressed with
evidence from the legislative history, if available, that the statute was only meant to apply to
individual construction workers. Even without such evidence, plaintiffs and enforcement agencies
can still argue that Section 181.723 does not apply to LLCs, and Minnesota courts should instead
apply Minnesota’s general unemployment compensation regulation that determines worker status
for unemployment compensation to worker-LLCs.
Although this strategy may help plaintiffs in some states, it is not ideal. Typically,
independent contractor statutes that target a specific industry are more protective of workers, as
they are often passed to combat misclassification in industries with widespread abuse.258 For
example, Minnesota’s general unemployment independent contractor definition does not presume
employee status, unlike Minn. Stat. § 181.723, the construction-specific statute.259 Thus, a court
may be more likely to find that a worker is an independent contractor under the general law than
under Section 181.723, even if the worker is an employee. Plaintiffs should consider the benefits
and possible risks of claiming the applicability of different statutes. A plaintiff should first argue
that he falls within the scope of the more protective statute. For example, plaintiffs might first
argue that Section 181.723, or a similar, more protective and specific statute, applies to business
entities that are shell corporations. However, until industry-specific statutes are amended to
explicitly include misclassification of workers as business entities, employers may try to avoid
253

Id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 2 (West 2014) (“This section only applies to
individuals performing public or private sector commercial or residential building construction or improvement
services.”).
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Frahs, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.035 subdiv. 15(a)(3) (West 2008)).

255

Frahs, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5; see MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014).
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Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d, 336, 342-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).

257

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 2 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., DONAHUE, LAMARE, & KOTLER, supra note 17, at 4 (noting significant rates of
misclassification in the construction industry).
259

Compare MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014) (“When determining whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor, five factors must be considered and weighed within a particular set of circumstances.”) with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (presuming an individual in the construction industry is an employee unless
certain conditions are met).
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liability by misclassifying workers in a deliberate attempt to avoid liability under new stricter
statutes. In those cases, a plaintiff may want to argue instead that a broader statute applies. At
best, that argument would put workers in the same position they were in before the stricter statute
was passed.
iv. Remedies for Workers Seeking Unemployment Benefits
If none of the above strategies apply, a worker who is trying to obtain unemployment
benefits may still have a remedy. In Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the
same court that found that construction LLCs could not be considered employees, found that
Heather Rowan was eligible for unemployment benefits, despite her having contracted with
Dream It, Inc. as an LLC.260 When Rowan’s hours as a painter for Dream It were reduced, the
company convinced her to form an LLC, explaining that because her wages would be calculated
in a different way, she would be able to make up the hours lost by being paid more per hour.261
The company did not tell her that she would lose her employee status, her eligibility for
unemployment benefits, and a guarantee of sufficient hours.262 Rowan then formed her own
limited liability corporation, and per Dream It’s request, signed a resignation letter.263 After
forming the LLC and resigning, Rowan continued to perform the same services for Dream It.264
Four weeks later, Dream It stopped giving Rowan assignments and Rowan applied for
unemployment benefits.265 Although the court followed Nelson in determining that an LLC could
not receive unemployment benefits because it could not be an employee, it still found that Rowan
was entitled to unemployment benefits.266 Because Dream It convinced Rowan to form her own
LLC and only informed her of the advantages, the court found that she had good cause to quit
when she resigned and formed her LLC.267 Thus, in this particular factual scenario, where a
worker first works for the employer as an employee, and is subsequently convinced by the
employer to form an LLC, the worker may be entitled to unemployment benefits. These benefits
stem from workers having good cause to quit when they stop working under their own individual
name, and begin working as an LLC. As a result, even if workers are unable to obtain a remedy
for wage violations or workers compensation, workers may still be able to obtain unemployment
benefits.
v. Establishing Liability for Businesses that Assist Employers in this New Misclassification
If a worker can establish that the employer is liable for misclassifying her as an
independent contractor by labeling her as a franchisee, limited liability corporation, or some other
corporate form, she can then try to establish liability for businesses that assist in this
misclassification. For example, she can argue that companies like U&I LLC, which help
employers classify workers as owners of LLCs, are liable for aiding and abetting the employer in
260

Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 880, 885 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
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misclassification.268 Such liability would apply regardless of how the plaintiff originally
established the employer’s own liability for misclassification, whether through the statute itself,
alter ego liability, or a court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
In Green v. Parts Distribution Xpress, Inc., the court found that a company that supplied
independent contractor agreements to an employer could be liable for aiding and abetting the
employer in violating the misclassification statute.269 In so finding, the court acknowledged that
the independent contractor statute that applied was silent as to the liability of third parties.270
However, under common law, a party can be liable if it knows another party’s conduct breaches a
duty and gives this first party substantial support or encouragement in breaching the duty.271
Because plaintiffs were relying on common law aiding and abetting, and because the
Massachusetts statutes at issue did not preclude such liability, the court found it irrelevant that the
Massachusetts statute did not expressly provide for third party liability.272 The court determined
the plaintiffs had successfully stated a claim for aiding and abetting liability by alleging that the
defendant knew that plaintiff’s employers “were planning to use the CMS form to deprive Green
and others similarly situated of their rights as employees and that CMS both substantially assisted
and acted in concert with PDX and Dealer Tire to accomplish that deprivation.”273 As a result,
once the employer’s liability is established, this remedy may be used to hold assisting agents
liable for misclassification, even where the statute is silent as to third party liability.274 However,
because few cases have applied aiding and abetting liability to those who assist in
misclassification, and in Green the court was only ruling on a motion to dismiss, it is unclear if
ultimately such a remedy will be successful in individual cases or if it will be harsh enough to
prevent more companies like U&I LLC from entering the market.
vi. Increasing Damage Awards for Workers Misclassified as Franchisees
In addition to wage remedies, which may be granted when a court finds that employees
are misclassified as franchisees, plaintiffs may also be entitled to receive damages in the amount
of the franchisee fees they paid to the franchisor. Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. (Awuah
III) addressed the damages that Awuah I found were owed to plaintiff janitorial workers for their
misclassification as franchisees.275 The court assessed whether one janitorial worker was entitled
to damages for the initial franchise fee of $3,250 as well as monthly royalty fees and management
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See Prichard, supra note 191.
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Green v. Parts Distribution Xpress, Inc., No. 10-11959-DJC, 2011 WL 5928580, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov.
29, 2011) (declining to dismiss claims against a company alleged to be aiding and abetting misclassification of workers).
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Id. at *3.
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Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (discussing third party liability for aiding
in the tortious conduct).
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Green, 2011 WL 5928580, at *3.
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Id. For a statute that expressly allows for third party liability see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503(d)
(West 2014) (“A person shall not knowingly incorporate or form, or assist in the incorporation or formation of, a
corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity, or pay or collect a fee for use of a foreign or
domestic corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity for the purpose of facilitating, or evading
detection of, a violation of this section.”) (emphasis added).
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Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 890, 891-92 (Mass. 2011).
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fees that totaled to fifteen percent of the amount Coverall charged customers.276 Under the
Massachusetts independent contractor statute, employees who are misclassified as independent
contractors are entitled to any “damages incurred” by the misclassification.277 The court found
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover these franchisee fees as part of the damages incurred for
misclassification.278 The court reasoned that the contract for these fees violated public policy, as,
in practice it “operate[d] to require employees to buy their jobs from employers” and thus was not
entitled to enforcement.279 As a result, workers who are misclassified as franchisees may be able
to have their franchise fees returned, in addition to the other damages misclassified workers are
generally are entitled to receive.
B. Subcontracting
Some employers have used subcontracting as a way to avoid liability for
misclassification. Although the presumption of employee status in the ABC test makes it more
difficult for employers to do so, even the ABC test can be exploited through the use of
subcontracting structures. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. v. Depianti (Jan-Pro I)
provides an example of one subcontracting business model that employers may be able to utilize
to avoid liability, even if misclassification occurs. In Jan-Pro I, plaintiff Jan-Pro Franchising
International Inc. (JPI) brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that two of its
franchisees were not its employees.280 JPI created a franchise brand and franchise process, which
regional franchises paid JPI for the rights to use.281 Regional franchisees subsequently entered
into contracts with worker-franchisees to perform cleaning services for customers supplied by the
regional franchisees.282 At issue was whether the third tier worker-franchisees were employees of
JPI.
In applying the Massachusetts ABC test, the court first determined that JPI met the “A”
prong of the test, as JPI lacked control over the third-tier worker-franchisees; only the regional
franchise at issue in the case, BradleyMktg Enterprises, Inc. (“BME”), had the ability to hire and
fire the worker-franchisees and the obligation to pay them.283 Additionally, JPI was not a party to
the contract between the worker-franchisees and BME.284 The court next determined that the
worker-franchisees performed services outside the course of JPI’s business, satisfying the “B”
prong of the test.285 Unlike Awuah I, where the court rejected the franchisor’s claim that it was in
the franchising business rather than the cleaning business, here, the three-tiered franchise structure
helped to support JPI’s contention that it truly was in the franchise business.286 JPI was not
involved in running the day-to-day cleaning businesses, as it did not market cleaning services,
276

Id. at 894, 900-01.
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MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2014).
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Awuah, 952 N.E.2d at 901.
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Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc. v. Depianti, 712 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
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collect payment from customers, or pay worker-franchisees for cleaning services.287 The court
determined that JPI merely created a business model and then sold the rights to this model.288 The
court then decided that the franchisees engaged in a separate business, satisfying prong “C,” for
some of the same reasons the court relied upon under the previous prongs.289 Because JPI was not
a party to the BME and worker-franchisee contracts, exerted no control over worker-franchisees,
and was engaged in the business of franchising, the franchisees were operating a distinct
business.290
The court did not determine whether BME had misclassified the worker-franchisees.291
However, it did mention it might have found differently if the worker-franchisees’ employee
status under BME was at issue, noting that BME sends invoices to customers, collects customer
payments, and sends backup franchisees to customers as needed.292 Thus, where a franchisor
separates itself from the worker-franchisees through another tier of franchisees, the franchisor
may be able to avoid liability for misclassification, even if the franchisor’s business model defines
the relationship between the middle franchisee and the worker-franchisees and leads the middle
franchisee to classify workers as franchisees. As a result, even if courts find that franchisees can
be considered employees, if franchisors build in enough tiers of franchisees into their model, they
may be able to avoid liability, and hedge the potential solutions suggested in the previous Part.
However, where there is control between the franchisor and middle franchisee, workers
and enforcement agencies may still have a remedy. In Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising
International, Inc. (Jan-Pro II), a class action was filed by the same workers at issue in Jan-Pro I,
alleging misclassification.293 The worker-franchisees this time argued that Jan-Pro was vicariously
liable for BME’s misclassification of the workers because BME was acting as Jan-Pro’s agent.294
Under the theory of vicarious liability, a party may be liable for another’s tortious acts based on
its relationship to the tortfeasor, regardless of fault.295 Thus, one possible solution for workers,
whether misclassified as business entities or independent contractors, is to argue that the
contractor is vicariously liable for the subcontractor’s acts, based on the master/servant
relationship between the contractor and subcontractor.296
The district court certified questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
about the proper vicarious liability standard to apply, as a majority of courts have adopted
narrower tests in the franchise context and the Massachusetts appellate court had not yet ruled on
the matter.297 In Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., the court followed this majority approach to a
franchisor’s vicarious liability, holding that a franchisor may only be held liable if it has control
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or a right of control over the franchisee’s daily operations.298 The court stated that the franchise
agreement itself cannot establish vicarious liability.299 The court reasoned that because franchisors
are frequently removed from day-to-day operations, imposing vicarious liability typically
provides less deterrence for franchisors than for employers.300 As a result, it would be irrelevant
under this test that the JPI business model in Jan-Pro I and II defined the relationship between
BME and the worker-franchisors, unless JPI was actually involved in controlling this relationship
in daily operations. Where courts have adopted the majority test, it may be more challenging for
franchisee plaintiffs to establish vicarious liability, and this may lead to increased classification of
workers as franchisees to avoid liability. In this way, new independent contractor statutes may be
pushing some employers further from the reach of the law; crafty employers who see an
opportunity in the combination of franchisee classifications and subcontracting models may be
able to avoid liability.
Even in this scenario, however, plaintiffs may not be completely without a remedy. Just
as workers may be able to hold liable those who assist employers in business entity
misclassification, even if workers cannot directly show an employee-employer relationship
between themselves and the contractor, they may be able to hold the contractor liable for aiding
and abetting the middle subcontractor in misclassification.301 Thus, under the facts of Jan-Pro I
and II, if the court were to find that BME misclassified the worker-franchisees, JPI could be held
liable for aiding and abetting BME in such misclassification by creating the business model that
was used to circumvent the independent contractor law. Workers’ rights advocates should keep
watch of this area. If this novel aiding and abetting liability fails302 and enforcement of
independent contractor misclassification increases, worker-franchisees may become more
prevalent.
C. Wage Avoidance
Some employers have tried to argue that the compensation their workers receive does not
constitute wages, either as evidence that the worker is not an employee or to avoid or reduce the
damages owed. Courts may consider payment of wages as a fact that evidences control,303 as
payment of wages is a factor considered in the common law right-to-control test.304 Additionally,
in at least one state, a worker must earn wages to be considered engaging in employment, and
thus to be considered an employee.305 As a result, employers may label payments to their workers
as something other than wages, or have the customers pay the worker directly, and then
subsequently charge the worker a fee. If successful, employers can avoid liability under the
298

Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 341.
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independent contractor statutes even if they have misclassified their employees as independent
contractors.
In Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., (Awuah II), the court discussed the damages
owed to one plaintiff who was misclassified by Coverall as a franchisee.306 In an effort to reduce
its damages, the cleaning franchisor tried to argue that the money the “franchisees” received was
not wages, but rather advances under an accounts receivable financing system.307 Under the
Coverall system, Coverall paid its workers in advance of receiving payment from customers.308
However, if the customer failed to pay Coverall within ninety days, the worker was responsible
for paying back the advance.309 Coverall argued that because the worker at issue never worked
overtime and received at least minimum wage, the worker did not incur any damages as required
under the statute, and thus he was not owed any damages for the misclassification.310 However,
because under Massachusetts law an employer is required to pay its employees within one week
of the pay period in which such wages were earned, Coverall also had to argue that payments
were not actually wages, but were advances, and thus Coverall was in compliance with
Massachusetts law.311
The court disagreed with Coverall and found that these advances were in fact wages, and
that Coverall was trying to evade Massachusetts wage law by using this system.312 The court
stated that at the time the workers completed their cleaning services, they had earned their wages,
and “[t]o impose an additional contingency of payment from a customer [on the worker],
particularly where he had no involvement in collecting the payment, is an improper attempt to
exempt Coverall from the Wage Act.”313 The court ordered Coverall to pay interest on the
chargebacks, as Coverall had already returned the chargebacks to the worker involved in the
action.314
Because the decision involved interpretations of Massachusetts’ statutory law, the district
court judge then certified questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, including
whether this accounts receivable financing system was proper.315 In Awuah III, Coverall tried to
argue that this account receivable financing system benefited workers and customers, enabling
workers to receive payments earlier and giving them more freedom in their work.316 Coverall
explained that if workers are at risk of losing income when customers withhold payment, the
workers have more incentive to provide adequate service, and thus require less supervision.317
Without this system, Coverall claimed that it would have to increase supervision of the workers,
which would impinge on the independence the workers currently possess in the workplace.318
306
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Ultimately, the court agreed with the district court and held that the classification of wages as
advances violates the Massachusetts Wage Act.319 The court rejected Coverall’s arguments,
stating that Coverall could impose sanctions or terminate a worker with poor work performance,
but Coverall could not withhold a worker’s wages as either a sanction or performance
incentive.320 Thus, although employers have attempted to avoid both liability and damages by
changing how they label the worker and the worker’s wages, in both contexts, courts appear to be
looking beyond the employer’s label.321
In some states, by labeling income as something other than wages, employers can
actually prevent a worker’s claim from even being considered. In Washington, the same issue
raised in Awuah has surfaced. However, because the Washington unemployment insurance statute
is structured differently, the issue arises before the determination of damages. Although
Washington has instituted a presumptive ABC test to define independent contractors,322 first a
worker must prove that he is engaging in employment, which requires showing that he is
performing personal services for wages.323 Thus, if a court determines that a worker was not paid
wages, the claim will not proceed. In Kabrick v. Employment Security Department of the State of
Washington, the Court of Appeals of Washington upheld the Employment Security Department’s
denial of unemployment benefits to Barbara Kabrick for this very reason.324 The court found that
as a taxi driver for Spo-Cab Inc., Ms. Kabrick did not earn wages because the money she was paid
by customers did not belong to Spo-Cab.325 If Ms. Kabrick was paid in cash, she kept the entire
fare, and if a customer paid by credit card, Spo-Cab would return almost the entire fare to her,
except for a small handling fee.326 Consequently, the court found that Spo-Cab merely “facilitated
their collection of fares” rather than paid wages, and as a result, Ms. Kabrick was not engaging in
employment for Spo-Cab.327
These threshold questions heavily increase the burden on workers, a result contrary to
the intention of the presumptive employee statute. Moreover, the wage inquiry may actually have
little to do with whether one is in reality an independent contractor. As such, including wages as a
threshold factor not only increases the burden on workers, but also significantly heightens the
importance of a factor that may be irrelevant. For example, in the Washington court’s
consideration of what constitutes wages, the court defines the wage test as whether the money
ever belonged to the employer.328 This test leaves room for crafty employers to evade the law
319

Id. at 893, 896-97, 901.

320

Id. at 897.

321
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merely by changing the order in which workers are paid and the party from whom the employer
receives payment. For instance, although Ms. Kabrick was able to keep almost the entire fare paid
by customers, she ultimately gave some of this money back to Spo-Cab.329 As part of her
agreement with Spo-Cab, she paid Spo-Cab a dispatch fee and administration fee on a weekly
basis.330 The dispatch fee was based on working sixty hours per week, and was not adjusted if a
driver worked less.331 Whether a worker is paid directly by customers, and later gives a share to
his or her employer, or whether the customer pays the employer first, should have little to do with
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.
At the very least, whether a worker is paid wages is of no greater significance than any
other fact that goes into the independent contractor analysis. Thus, it should only be considered in
analyzing whether an employer exerts control over the worker, the “A” prong of the ABC test, or
in reference to any of the other prongs of the test if relevant. Under this approach, all facts can be
analyzed and weighed together, at the same time, to determine if the totality of these facts
suggests an employee or an independent contractor relationship.
In Kabrick, many facts suggested that the worker was an employee under Washington’s
presumptive ABC test. For example, Spo-cab trained its drivers, controlled their schedules,
prohibited them from working for other companies or hiring substitutes, and fined them for late
paperwork and unclean cabs.332 As a result, if the court was able to engage in the actual
independent contractor analysis it may have found differently. As it stands, Washington’s
threshold analysis can be used as a mechanism to prevent the court from reaching the actual
independent contractor analysis, where it can evaluate all of the facts at the same time. Instead, it
forces the court to first focus separately on smaller factors that can be easily manipulated.
The Washington statute should be altered to remove this threshold inquiry. Until that
occurs, plaintiffs can argue that employers are merely trying to circumvent the law through such
reordering of payments. Plaintiffs can rely on Awuah II and Awuah III as examples of a court
rejecting such relabeling of wages, arguing that reordering allows employers to circumvent the
independent contractor misclassification statute. If successful, and the court ultimately finds the
workers to be employees, plaintiffs can also argue based on Awuah III that this payment system
violates public policy, as it forces employees to pay for their jobs.333 The employer would then be
required to refund the fees charged, such as the dispatch and administration fees in Kabrick.
D. Use of Semantic Distinctions to Allege Lack of Control and Different
Courses of Business
With new presumptive and conjunctive independent contractor tests, many employers
have tried to re-characterize their employment relationships, incorporating language from
independent contractor statutes into their independent contractor agreements with their workers.
First, this Part will briefly explore this phenomenon and courts’ reactions. This Part will then
address unsuccessful employer attempts to re-characterize the nature of their business to get
around the “B” prong in the ABC test that requires an independent contractor to perform services
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outside the usual course of business of the employer.334 Although there are myriad factual
circumstances in independent contractor cases, there are common arguments employers have
made in an attempt to prove the worker does not meet this element.
1. Contract Drafting
Under the presumptive ABC test, generally, employers must prove three elements: the
worker is free from control, the worker performs services outside the employer’s course of
business, and the worker has his or her own independent business that typically performs the same
services as those done for the employer.335 Some employers have included language from this test
in their independent contractor agreements. Employers that correctly classify workers as
independent contractors may also include such language in their independent contractor
agreements when it reflects the reality of the relationship. However, employers attempting to
evade independent contractor laws may use the independent contractor agreement as evidence that
the worker is an independent contractor, even if the arrangement in practice functions differently
than the employer’s carefully selected language suggests. For example, some employers have
specifically written into their contracts that the worker has sole control over his or her work, when
the employer in practice controlled its workers.336 In Western Ports, the court looked beyond the
wording of the contract, finding that the worker was not in reality free from the employer’s
control.337 In making this determination, the court found it significant that the worker, a truck
driver, was required to clean his truck, obtain company permission to carry passengers, and go to
the company dispatch center to receive new unscheduled assignments.338 Additionally, truck
drivers could be disciplined or terminated for violating any company policy, and more
specifically, for tardiness, dishonesty, theft, unsafely operating the truck, as well as a number of
other acts.339 Other courts have similarly found that the independent contractor agreement is not
dispositive, and have engaged in an analysis of the actual control exerted by the employers.340 As
a result, although employers will likely continue to tailor their independent contractor agreements
in a way that looks as though the worker meets the elements, thus far it has had little impact on
courts’ ultimate evaluation. In this regard, once again, courts have chosen to look beyond mere
labels. To ensure that courts continue to look beyond labels, it may be important for states to
explicitly include in the “A” prong that the worker’s freedom from control must be found both in
the contract and in fact, as has been done by Massachusetts, Maryland, New York and

334

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2) (West 2014).

335

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014);
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2014).
336
See, e.g., W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., 41 P.3d 510, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting contractual language that “‘the manner and means of conducting the work are under the sole control of the
Contractor’”); Kabrick, No. 20126-1-III, 2002 WL 91270, at *1 (quoting language from the Dispatch Agreement that the
driver is “‘free from interference or control on the part of Spokane Cab in the operation of said taxicab’”).
337

W. Ports Transp., Inc., 41 P.3d at 516 (“Contractual language, such as a provision describing drivers as
independent contractors, is not dispositive; instead, the court considers all the facts related to the work situation.”); id. at
520.
338

Id. at 517-18.

339

Id. at 518.

340

See, e.g., Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 917 P.2d 136, 142-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“[C]ontracts alone
are not dispositive.”).
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Nebraska.341
2. “Course of Business” Semantic Arguments
In Massachusetts, a number of employers have tried to re-characterize the purpose of
their businesses to argue that their workers are engaged in services distinct from services the
business provides. This argument is especially important in states like Massachusetts where an
employer can only argue that the workers work outside the usual course of the employer’s
business to meet the “B” prong of their ABC test.342 Under some other states’ ABC statutes,
employers have the option of proving the workers work outside of the employer’s place of
business instead.343 However, no matter which form of the statute the state uses, these arguments
still have an impact where the worker does work in the employer’s usual place of business.
In three separate cases in which exotic dancers for different employers claimed they were
misclassified, the employers tried to argue that they were not in the business of providing exotic
dancing, but rather that the employers were in the business of selling alcohol.344 In the first case
that arose, employer King Arthur’s Lounge analogized its business to a sports bar and its workers
to televisions in that sports bar.345 It explained that dancing is simply a form of entertainment
provided for customers, just as televisions and pool tables in sports bars provide entertainment to
customers.346 King Arthur’s argued that just as a sports bar’s provision of televisions and pool
tables does not mean that the sports bar is in the business of sports, King Arthur’s provision of
exotic dancers did not mean that it was in the business of providing exotic dancing.347 In rejecting
this argument, the court stated that it “would need to be blind to human instinct to decide that live
nude entertainment was equivalent to the wallpaper of routinely-televised matches, games,
tournaments and sports talk in such a place.”348 The court explained that customers attend exotic
dancing establishments to see exotic dancers, whereas patrons at sports bars attend mainly to
purchase alcohol; watching television and playing pool are secondary.349 Additionally, the stage
341

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1) (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3903(c)(1)(ii)(1) (LexisNexis 2014); N.Y. LAB. § 861-c(1)(a) (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a)
(LexisNexis 2014).
342

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2) (West 2014) (“[T]he service is performed outside the
usual course of the business of the employer . . . .”).
343
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(b) (West 2014) (“Such service is either outside the
usual course of business for which such service is performed, or that such service is performed outside of all the places of
business of the enterprises for which such service is performed . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4(b) (West 2014) (“[T]he
service is either outside the usual course of the business for which the service is performed, or the service is performed
outside of all the places of business of the employer for which the service is performed . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1)(ii)(3) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[T]he work is[(A)] outside of the usual course of business of the person
for whom the work is performed; or [(B)] performed outside of any place of business of the person for whom the work is
performed.”).
344

Chaves v. King Arthur’s Lounge, Inc., No. 07-2505, 2009 WL 3188948, at *1 (Mass. Super. July 30,
2009); Monteiro v. PJD Entm’t of Worcester, Inc., No. 101930, 2011 WL 7090703, at *1 (Mass. Super. Nov. 23, 2011);
Jenks v. D. & B. Corp., No. 09-01978, 2011 WL 3930190, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 24, 2011).
345

Chaves, 2009 WL 3188948, at *1.

346

Id.

347

Id.

348

Id.

349

Id.
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the dancers performed upon was in the center of the lounge, unlike sports bars, which have no
special architectural design that allows patrons to better view televisions.350 Ultimately, the court
found that King Arthur’s was in the business of providing adult entertainment, and that the
dancers work in the course of that business because of the revenue derived from exotic dancing
services and its overall importance to this business.351
Similarly, in Monteiro v. PJD Entertainment of Worcester, Inc., employer Centerfolds
argued that it was in the restaurant and bar business, and merely allowed exotic dancers to
perform.352 The court rejected this argument, ruling broadly that a business that serves alcohol and
that has a place for exotic dancers to perform is in the adult entertainment business.353 As a result,
the court found that the plaintiff exotic dancers had been misclassified because their dancing was
in the course of Centerfold’s adult entertainment business.354 Thus, in the exotic dancing context,
courts have so far rejected employers’ attempts to argue that a specific part of the business is the
entirety of the business and that the service the workers at issue perform is not the business’s
focus.
These arguments are not unique to the employment of exotic dancers. In Awuah I, the
defendant franchisor argued that the janitorial franchisee plaintiffs were not performing services
in the course of its business by claiming that it was not in the cleaning business, but rather in the
franchise business.355 Similarly, in Network Communications, Inc. v. Employment Security
Department of the State of Washington, the court determined that newspaper deliverers worked in
the course of the employer’s business, despite the employer’s attempt to argue that it was in the
business of publishing newspapers, rather than delivering newspapers.356 The court found that
Network Communications was in the business of both publishing and delivering papers.357 Thus,
despite some employers’ attempts to re-characterize the nature of their businesses, courts have
been unwilling to draw such stringent lines in defining a business’s purpose and have rejected an
employer’s attempt to limit and distinguish its business from the services that many of its workers
perform.
In another case involving newspaper deliverers, the court similarly found that the
employer was in the business of both publishing and delivering papers.358 However, the statute at
issue was the Massachusetts unemployment insurance statute, which uses the version of the ABC
test that allows employers to prove either that the worker performed services outside the usual
course of the employer’s business, or worked outside the employer’s place of business.359
Because such newspaper deliverers delivered papers outside of the Athol Daily News building,
the court found that the workers did not perform services in Athol Daily News’s place of
350

Id.

351

Id.

352

Monteiro, 2011 WL 7090703, at *2.

353

Id.

354

Id.; see also Jenks, 2011 WL 3930190, at *3-4 (finding plaintiff exotic dancers were misclassified as
independent contractors because plaintiffs performed services in the course of Golden Banana’s adult entertainment
business).
355

Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82-83 (D. Mass. 2010).

356

Network Commc’n, Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., No. 60212-8-I, 2008 WL 1851103, at *4 (Wash.
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).
357

See id.

358

Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of Div. of Emp’t and Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 2003).

359

See id. at 369-370 (referencing ABC test in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 2).
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business.360 Thus, some versions of the ABC test can still be strengthened by eliminating the place
of business portion of this prong of the test. To prove a worker is an independent contractor, even
with the place of business portion present, the employer still has to prove the worker is outside of
its control and engaged in an independent business. However, this version of the test places too
much weight on the innocuous factor of where a worker performs its services. Although where the
worker works might be relevant to the analysis, it is likely a factor that may influence the course
of business determination or the control element, and thus is not so dispositive that it should be
explicit in the test.
IV. CONCLUSION
States have taken action against misclassification, and it appears their actions in many
cases have followed the most effective statutory models available. While strategies have been
tailored to the existing laws of each state as well as to varied political realities, the three-pronged
ABC test and the presumption of employee status have clearly taken hold as the favored model
for defining an independent contractor. Revising statutes towards this test is a particularly
effective measure when it creates a set of laws that provide one independent contracting definition
across all workers, although there are valid arguments in favor of tackling legislative reform
aimed at certain industries. While states have undertaken understandable alterations to ABC, in
some cases including additional objective criteria that could narrow the ability of courts to infuse
the application of ABC with common law interpretation, such variety across states blocks the
expansion of a uniform standard for independent contracting across the country.
Measuring the particular efficacy of changes to the penalization of misclassification and
the enforcement of such laws is more challenging. Nonetheless, states appear to be vigorously
experimenting with mechanisms to increase compliance with their laws, including the
penalization of intentional misclassification, the use of criminal liability and stop-work orders,
and the implementation of successor liability and private rights of action. Given the costs when
state agencies carry the burden of investigating misclassification, this menu of strategies should
be adopted together rather than as alternatives to each other. Changes to simplify and clarify
independent contracting definitions benefit well-intentioned employers, while increased
punishments can be aimed at employers who endeavor to break the law. Moreover, such penalties
can serve to invest the law-abiding business community in the state’s effort to crack down on
misclassification. States should communicate about the usefulness of new measures, as a standard
set of punishments across states could assist in placing employers on notice of the stakes of
misclassification.
While the wave of legislation across states amending or instituting new independent
contractor laws has made it more difficult for employers to misclassify workers, some employers
have still found new ways to avoid liability under these statutes. Yet, not every new tactic has
been successful. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the ABC test is fair to both workers and
employers, although some improvements are still needed. Repeatedly, employers have attempted
to use labels or semantic distinctions to avoid liability under these statutes. To establish that they
lack control over their workers, under the “A” prong of the ABC test, employers have phrased
their independent contractor agreements to reflect a lack of control. Other employers have argued
that their workers are not paid wages, as evidence that this control is lacking or that there is
simply no employment relationship at all. Employers have also used semantic distinctions to
360

Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

102

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

2/17/15 3:14 PM

[Vol. 18.1

argue that workers perform services outside of the employers’ course of business; the “B” prong
of the ABC test. Employers have tried to distinguish services performed by workers from the
main purpose of the business. On the whole, most courts have rejected such hollow distinctions.
In Utah, Minnesota, Washington and Massachusetts, employers have contracted with
workers as business entities, such as LLCs or franchisees, in an attempt to avoid both the wage
and tax obligations that come with hiring employees, as well as the increasing likelihood of being
found liable for misclassification under presumptive statutes.361 Faced with these new
classifications, some courts have still engaged in the independent contractor analysis, using the
“B” and “C” prongs as guides to determine whether such entities are in fact distinct businesses,
separate from the employer’s business. In other states, employers have been successful at using
this new form of misclassification to avoid liability for independent contractor misclassification
because the statute prevents corporate forms from being employees. Statutory schemes need to be
corrected to close this loophole, applying the employee presumption to all business entities. Even
if statutes are amended, however, some employers may still be able to avoid liability for
misclassification through the use of subcontracting. Even if a second tier contractor misclassifies
workers according to the contractor’s plan, if the contractor does not have a direct relationship to
the workers, the contractor may be able to avoid liability. Worker plaintiffs can argue that the
employer is vicariously liable for the second tier’s misclassification, and depending on the law in
the jurisdiction, they may be successful. As enforcement actions increase, workers’ rights
advocates should monitor these areas of concern, and advocate for statutory reform where it is
still needed, to prevent the problems identified from becoming more widespread.

361

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014).
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APPENDIX

State

Statutes Cited

California

CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014)

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014)

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3169a (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-76a (West 2014); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-288 (West 2014)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3502
(West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3507 (West 2014); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3508 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3509 (West
2014)
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
185/25 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40 (West 2014); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
185/50 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/55 (West 2014); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
185/75 (West 2014)
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-8.1-3-21.2 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-2
(West 2014)

Delaware

Illinois

Indiana
Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West
2014)

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A,
§ 102 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13) (2010) (repealed
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2014)
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-902 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-903.1 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-908
(LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-909 (LexisNexis
2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-915 (LexisNexis 2014)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West
2014)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.722 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723
subdiv. 4 (West 2011) (amended 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 (West
2014); MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014)

Maryland

Massachusetts
Minnesota
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NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604 (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis
2014)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:20-1 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-8
(West 2014)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2005)

New York

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e
(McKinney 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f (McKinney 2014)

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.700
(West 2014)

Pennsylvania

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.5 (West
2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.7
(West 2014)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2 (LexisNexis 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2103 (LexisNexis 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-301 (LexisNexis 2014)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 692 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708
(West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 710 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1314a (West 2014)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.170 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 50.04.100 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.145 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 51.08.181 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §51.08.195 (West 2014)
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.005 (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West
2014)

Utah
Vermont
Washington

Wisconsin
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